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Abstract
I investigate the welfare effect of conservation areas that preserve historic districts
by regulating development. Such regulation may improve quality of life but does so
by reducing housing productivity – that is, the efficiency with which inputs (land
and non-land) are converted into housing services. Using a unique panel dataset for
English cities and an instrumental variable approach, I find that conservation areas
lead to higher house prices for given land values and building costs (lower housing
productivity) and higher house prices for given wages (higher quality of life). The
overall welfare impact is found to be negative.
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1 Introduction
Conservation areas protect historic neighbourhoods by placing restrictions on the aesthetic
quality of new development.1 Conservation areas are particularly widespread in England
with more than 9,600 designations since the legislation came into effect in 1967. Inside
a conservation area, any new development is required to preserve or enhance the existing
character of the neighbourhood. Similar policies exist in different forms internationally, for
example, as local historic districts in the United States or as Ensembleschutz in Germany.
By regulating the subjective quality of new buildings, conservation areas may reduce the
productivity of the housing sector. Historic neighbourhoods are no doubt an important
urban amenity, however, their preservation may hinder cities in affordably housing their
current and future populations.
I estimate the welfare effect of conservation areas by assembling a unique panel dataset
for English cities. The dataset comprises eleven years of conservation area designations
over 1997–2007, as well as house prices, land values, construction costs, and other city
characteristics. I construct my dataset at the city-level in order to capture the full costs
and benefits of the policy at the level of the housing market. Specifically, I use the Housing
Market Area (HMA) definition of urban areas.2 I estimate a net welfare effect comprised
of quality of life effects (benefits) and housing productivity effects (costs). The quality
of life effect is derived from the amenity value that households place on the historic built
environment in their city and its conservation. A city-level analysis captures benefits at the
neighbourhood level – since residents are more likely to live inside or near a conservation
area if they are widespread in a city – and at the city-level i.e. the value that residents place
on the amount of preservation in their urban area as a whole.
The costs of conservation are modelled as a housing productivity effect i.e. the effec-
tiveness with which land and non-land inputs are converted into housing services. Under-
lying this is the assumption that productivity, and not quantity, is the major channel for
the supply-side effects of designation.3 Indeed, the purpose of conservation areas is not to
prevent development but to ensure that new buildings preserve the character of a neighbour-
1Conservation areas protect groups of buildings within certain boundaries. Single buildings are usually
protected by different legislation, e.g. ‘listed buildings’ status in England.
2Housing Market Areas (HMAs) are defined to capture individual housing markets, based on evidence
from patterns of commuting, migration and house prices [DCLG, 2010]. As such, they are characterised by a
high level of self-containment – 77.5% of working residents of an HMA have their workplace inside the HMA
– and typically approximate recognisable city regions.
3I provide some empirical support for this assumption by showing that conservation area designations do
not impact negatively on dwelling stock in England over 2001–2010.
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hood. Such aesthetic restrictions may lower housing productivity in several ways. Firstly,
developers wishing to build inside conservation areas must navigate an extra layer of regu-
lation. Secondly, the planned buildings must meet certain standards, which may not be the
most cost effective way of providing housing services. Thirdly, the extra costs of developing
inside conservation areas may push development out to less favourable sites in a city. For
these reasons, cities with lots of conservation areas will be less productive in the housing
sector than other cities. Developers will be able to produce fewer units of housing services
for given amounts of land and non-land inputs resulting in higher housing costs. A city-level
analysis is required to capture productivity effects that determine prices at the level of the
housing market.
There is a growing body of literature on the economic effects of conservation areas. The
majority of this literature has focussed on estimating the quality of life effects of conser-
vation areas by examining property prices. A distinction commonly made in the literature
[e.g. by Coulson and Leichenko, 2001] is between (negative) internal effects related to re-
strictions to property rights and (positive) external effects related to the conservation of
neighbourhood character. Quasi-experimental evidence has shown that the overall effect of
designating conservation areas is to increase property prices, which suggests that the posi-
tive effects dominate [Ahlfeldt et al., 2017, Koster et al., 2014].4 Furthermore, Koster et al.
[2014] find that households with higher incomes have a higher willingness to pay for living
inside conservation areas in the Netherlands. Ahlfeldt et al. [2017] find that the pattern of
house price effects in England is consistent with a situation where local planners designate
conservation areas according to the interests of local owners. If local owners who benefit
from designation are indeed able to game the planning system to their advantage then it
important to know what the effects of designation on housing costs are at the wider market
level.
There is a current lack of evidence on the supply-side effects of conservation areas. The
only evidence to date is presented by Been et al. [2015], who show that construction is slightly
lower inside historic districts in New York City. However, they do not examine quantity
effects at the city level or supply-related effects on housing costs. The evidence from other
forms of regulation suggests that the costs of development restrictions are significant.5 For
example, Hilber and Vermeulen [2014] find that house prices in England would be 35% lower
4Other studies that examine the impact of conservation areas on property prices include Asabere et al.
[1989], Asabere and Huffman [1994], Asabere et al. [1994], Coulson and Lahr [2005], Leichenko et al. [2001],
Noonan [2007], Noonan and Krupka [2011], Schaeffer and Millerick [1991].
5See Gyourko and Molloy [2015] for a good overview of the evidence.
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if planning constraints were removed. The available evidence finds that the quality of life
benefits associated with planning are smaller than the costs. Glaeser et al. [2005] examine
building height restrictions in Manhattan, a policy that is intended to prevent towering
developments that block the light and view available to existing structures. They find that
the development restrictions led to large increases in house prices that left residents worse
off, even after accounting for the policy benefits. This ‘regulatory tax’ finding is repeated in
other studies such as Albouy and Ehrlich [2012] and Turner et al. [2014], both for regulatory
constraints in the U.S., and Cheshire and Sheppard [2002] for land use planning in Reading,
England.6
In this paper, I investigate the extent to which conservation areas explain differences
in housing productivity across cities and whether there are associated quality of life im-
provements that compensate. As such, I provide an estimate of the net welfare effect of
conservation areas for the average (owner occupier) household. Evaluation of the welfare ef-
fects of conservation areas in cities is challenging since both quality of life (via demand) and
housing productivity (via supply) result in increased house prices. In order to disentangle
these effects, I make use of Albouy and Ehrlich’s [2012] two-step approach. In the first step I
estimate a cost function regressing house prices on input prices (land and non-land) and city
characteristics that may shift productivity. Housing productivity is defined as the amount
of physical housing that can be produced for given quantities of inputs. The key assumption
behind this step is perfect competition. If designation makes building more costly then house
prices will be higher for given input prices to maintain zero profits. I find that the average
increase in conservation area designation share at the HMA level over 1997–2007 decreases
housing productivity by 4.3%, implying a cost-driven increase in house prices of the same
magnitude. In the second step, I construct an expenditure-equivalent quality of life index
based on house prices and wages and regress it on the same productivity shifters, including
designation. The key assumption here is of household mobility. Spatial equilibrium implies
that if designation improves quality of life in a city then house prices must be higher for
given wage levels. I find that designation increases quality of life, but not by enough to
compensate for the greater expenditure on housing resulting from lower productivity. The
results imply that designations in England over 1997–2007 were welfare-decreasing for an
average owner-occupier household in these cities.
While I make use of the Albouy and Ehrlich [2012] approach, my key contribution is dif-
6Further studies find that planning policies have damaging effects on the retail sector [Cheshire and
Hilber, 2008, Cheshire et al., 2011].
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ferent. I focus on estimating the welfare effect of a particular form of regulation, conservation
areas, rather than of housing regulation in general. Conservation areas are a particularly fit-
ting application for the approach since they are expected to impact on housing productivity
less than quantity, specifically. Moreover, focussing on a particular form of regulation allows
me to identify a causal impact by employing an instrumental variables approach. Finally,
my paper distinguishes itself by focussing on England rather than the United States, and by
constructing a panel dataset that allows me to control for fixed unobservables.
My identification strategy involves an instrumental variables approach. The instrument
for designation is a shift-share of the Bartik type [Bartik, 1991]. The closest previous ap-
proach is Koster and Rouwendal [2017] who use national-level changes in spending on cultural
heritage weighted by the local share of listed dwellings as an instrument for local investment
in historic amenities. My instrument uses changes in the national-level designation shares
for the dwelling stock of particular build periods weighted by the HMA shares of dwellings in
those build periods. The national level changes in designation are assumed to reflect changes
in the subjective evaluation of the dwelling stock of particular build periods. As such, the
instrument is a fairly novel application of the shift-share approach. The identifying assump-
tion is that the instrument is unrelated to unobserved shocks to housing productivity or
quality of life, conditional on pre-trends in house prices, trends related to the initial value of
the instrument (capturing the initial stock), and trends related to other city characteristics.
I support the validity of this assumption by showing that the instrument is not related to
gentrification.
The key contribution of this paper is to estimate both the supply-side costs and demand-
side benefits of conservation areas; evidence that is currently missing from the growing body
of literature on the policy. This paper also contributes to a literature that investigates the
costs and benefits of regulation and planning more generally. I present some of the first
causal estimates of the welfare effects of a form of housing regulation. To my knowledge
the only previous paper to examine both the costs and benefits of housing regulation using
exogenous policy variation is Turner et al. [2014]. I also contribute to a literature on the
value of locational amenities, by estimating the quality of life effect of a regulation policy
instrumented at the city level.7
Furthermore, my results contribute to the literature on housing production functions
by estimating what is, to my knowledge, one of the first housing production functions for
7The amenities literature is large, but a few examples are Albouy [2016], Bayer et al. [2007], Brueckner
et al. [1999], Chay and Greenstone [2005], Cheshire and Sheppard [1995], Gibbons et al. [2011], Glaeser et al.
[2001], Moeller [2018].
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the UK. I follow Albouy and Ehrlich [2012] who take the traditional approach of regressing
house prices on input prices [e.g. McDonald, 1981, Thorsnes, 1997]. A more recent literature
attempts to estimate the production function, treating housing as a latent variable [Ahlfeldt
and McMillen, 2014, Combes et al., 2016, Epple et al., 2010]. According to Combes et al.
[2016], the two major challenges with estimating any type of housing production function
are data availability and disentangling housing quantity from its price. Data availability is a
challenge since the approach usually requires data on both house prices and land values. As
discussed, I construct a unique panel dataset of cities that includes house prices and some
previously unused data for land values and constructions costs for England. The land value
data, depicted in Figure 1 for 2007 play a key role in the production function step and in
estimating the productivity impact of designation.
Figure 1: Residential land values by local authority, 2007
Notes: Valuation Office Agency data. Assessed residential land value for small sites with outline planning
permission. Areas are extruded proportionally with land value.
The second challenge is disentangling housing quantity from its price, which is difficult
due to unobservable property characteristics that impact on price. Having collected a panel
dataset, I am able to estimate the cost function using fixed effects, which helps to overcome
the problem of unobserved property characteristics. My preferred estimates of the land cost
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share (0.29) and the elasticity of substitution between land and non-land inputs (0.53) fall
within the range in the literature.8
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2 I lay out the theoretical
model which demonstrates the potential effects of conservation areas on quality of life and
housing productivity. In section 3 I go over the data used in empirical analysis. In section 4 I
outline the two-step empirical approach and the identification strategy. In section 5 I present
the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
In this section, I describe how conservation area designation impacts on housing productivity
and quality of life in a general equilibrium context. I use the model of Albouy and Ehrlich
[2012], which is an inter-city spatial equilibrium framework based on work by Roback [1982]
and Albouy [2016]. Each city j is small relative to the national economy and produces a
traded good X and housing Y that is non-traded. The city-specific price of a standard hous-
ing unit is pj and the uniform price of the traded good is equal to the numeraire. Households
with homogeneous preferences work in either the Y -sector or the X-sector and consume both
housing and the traded good. The model involves two important assumptions; that of per-
fect competition, which gives the zero profit conditions, and that of labour mobility, which
gives the spatial equilibrium conditions.
2.1 Housing production under zero profits
Since the focus of this paper is on the housing sector the derivations for the traded good
are relegated to footnotes. The housing good Y represents physical housing services. By
‘physical’, it is meant that the housing services are derived from the characteristics of the
physical unit itself. Benefits derived from neighbourhood quality will come in to the indi-
vidual utility function via a quality of life measure defined later on. Firms produce housing
services in each city according to:9
Yj = AYj F Y (L,M) (1)
8For example, Albouy and Ehrlich [2012] find a land cost share of about one third and an elasticity of
substitution of 0.5 for the United States.
9The traded good is produced from land, labour and capital according to Xj = AXj FX(L,NX ,K) where
AXj is traded good productivity, NX is traded good labour (paid wages wXj ) and K is mobile capital paid a
price i everywhere.
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where AYj is a city-specific housing productivity shifter, F Y is a constant returns to scale
(CRS) production function, L is land (price rj in each city) and M is the materials (non-
land) input to housing (paid price vj). Materials are conceptualised as all non-land factors
to housing production including labour and machinery. The housing productivity shifter
represents the efficiency with which developers can convert land and non-land factors into
housing services and is a function of city-specific attributes which may include the level of
conservation area designation. Specifically, designation will impact negatively on AYj if the
policy makes it more difficult to produce housing services. As discussed in the introduction,
I assume that the major supply-side effects of designation come through the productivity
rather than the quantity channel. The validity of this assumption has important empirical
implications that are discussed in subsection 2.4 below. Changes in AYj are assumed to be
factor-neutral productivity shifts i.e. the relative factor productivity remains unchanged.
However, I demonstrate robustness to this the factor-neutrality assumption in the empirics.
Firms choose between factors to minimise the unit cost at given factor prices cj(rj, vj;Aj) =
minL,M
{
rjL+ vjM : F Y (L,M ;Aj) = 1
}
. Zero profits imply the unit price of housing is
equal to this unit cost, i.e. pj = cj(rj, vj;Aj). Log-linearisation and taking deviations
around the national average gives the zero profit condition:10
p˜j = φLr˜j + φM v˜j − A˜Yj (2)
where for any variable z the tilde notation represents log differences around the national
average, i.e. z˜j = ln zj − ln z¯, where z¯ is the national average, φL is the land cost share for
housing and φM is the non-land cost share. This condition tells us that for each city the
house price is given by the sum of the factors’ prices (weighted by their cost shares) minus
productivity. Cities with lower housing productivity must have higher house prices for given
factor prices in order to maintain zero profits.
Figure 2 illustrates this point by plotting house prices against land values (holding ma-
terials costs constant) in an illustrative diagram. The average productivity curve shows how
house prices relate to input prices (land values) for cities of average productivity, such as
York and Cambridge. As the input price increases, house prices must also increase to main-
tain zero profits. The curve is concave since developers can substitute away from land as it
becomes more expensive. Cities above the curve, such as Brighton, are considered to have
low housing productivity because they have higher house prices for the same input price.
10Zero profits in the traded good sector is given by A˜Xj = θLr˜j + θNwX where θL and θN are the land and
labour cost shares, respectively, for the traded good.
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Brighton has the same land value as Cambridge but ends up with more expensive housing
because it is less effective at converting the inputs into outputs. The productivity differ-
ence between two cities such as Brighton and Cambridge can be inferred from the vertical
difference between them.11
2.2 Location choice under spatial equilibrium
Households with homogeneous preferences have a utility function Uj(x, y;Qj) that is quasi-
concave in the traded good x and housing y and increases in city-specific quality of life Qj.12
Quality of life is determined by non-market amenities that are available in each city, such as
air quality or employment access. These may also include conservation area designation. An
increase in designation impacts positively on Qj if preservation has amenity value. As the
designation share in a city increases it becomes more likely that a representative household
lives inside or close to a conservation area. Furthermore, the general level of preservation
in a city may be of amenity value to all residents. Households supply one unit of labour
to receive a wage wj, to which a non-wage income I is added to make total household
incomemj. Households optimally allocate their budget according to the expenditure function
e(pj, u;Qj) = minx,y {x+ pjy : Uj(x, y;Qj) ≥ u}. Households are assumed to be perfectly
mobile, therefore, spatial equilibrium occurs when all locations offer the same utility level
u¯. Perfect mobility is consistent with an extensive empirical literature that shows migration
flows follow economic incentives [e.g. Linneman and Graves, 1983, Graves and Waldman,
1991, Gyourko and Tracy, 1991]. A more direct test of spatial equilibrium is provided by
Greenwood et al. [1991] who find little evidence of disequilibrium pricing in income across
cities. Indeed, Notowidigdo [2011] estimates mobility costs finding they are “at most modest
and are comparable for both high-skill and low-skill workers” (p. 4).
Locations with higher house prices or lower levels of quality of life amenities must there-
fore be compensated with higher income after tax τ , i.e. e(pj, u¯;Qj) = (1 − τ)(wj + I).
Log-linearised around national average this spatial equilibrium condition is:
Q˜j = syp˜j − (1− τ)sww˜j (3)
11To complete the firm-side of the model, the non-land input is produced using labour and capital Mj =
FM (NY ,K) and the equivalent zero profit condition gives v˜j = αw˜Y , where α is the labour cost share of
the non-land input.
12There are two types of worker: housing sector and traded good sector. They may each receive a different
wage and may be attracted to different amenities. The condition for only one type of worker is presented
here for simplicity.
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where sy is the average share of expenditure on housing, τ is the average marginal income tax
rate and sw is the average share of income that comes from wages. The spatial equilibrium
condition tells us that in each city the (expenditure-equivalent) quality of life must be equal
to the unit house price minus the wage (weighted by expenditure shares). Cities with a
higher quality of life must have higher house prices for given wages to compensate.
2.3 The impacts of designation on house prices
The two conditions, zero profit and spatial equilibrium, both suggest that conservation areas
may increase house prices but the two channels are entirely separate. It is worth underlining
here exactly how these two channels operate since this is the mechanism on which the sub-
sequent empirical approach is based. Firstly, if designation impacts on housing productivity
only then house prices must be higher for given input prices in order to maintain zero profits
(equation 2). This point is illustrated by the example of Brighton over Cambridge in Figure 2.
Since quality of life is left unaffected, higher house prices in cities with designation must be
compensated for by higher wages in order to maintain spatial equilibrium (equation 3). In
this way, the quality of life index remains unaffected by housing productivity shocks from
designation. Secondly, if designation impacts on quality of life only then house prices must
be higher for given wage levels in order to maintain zero spatial equilibrium (equation 3).
Since housing productivity is unaffected, higher house prices must be associated with higher
input prices to maintain zero profits (equation 2). Figure 2 does not include wages so qual-
ity of life differences cannot be illustrated. However, if wages were held constant then an
increase in quality of life could look like a movement from Cambridge to York. Thus, the
quality of life effect cannot be confused with the housing productivity effect, and the housing
productivity effect cannot be confused with the quality of life effect.
2.4 Quantity effects, preference heterogeneity and sorting
So far the costs of designation have been treated as a productivity effect, rather than a
quantity effect. This assumption has been motivated by the fact that conservation areas
do not ban development (as in zoning) or specifically restrict the amount of housing (as in
height restrictions), but instead impose aesthetic standards that may make building more
costly. Whilst there is no specific provision for height restrictions in conservation area policy,
the local planning authority is fairly free to decide which buildings they feel preserve the
character of the neighbourhood and which do not. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that
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they favour lower-rise buildings, effectively imposing a height restriction. Furthermore, even
if conservation areas do not restrict the amount of housing directly, there may be quantity
adjustments resulting from housing productivity reductions.
The Albouy and Ehrlich [2012] model neatly sidesteps quantity effects by the assumption
of homogeneous individuals. Even if there are quantity effects, this has no impact on city
prices because the new marginal resident has the same willingness to pay as the old marginal
resident (holding quality of life constant). In a similar model, Albouy and Farahani [2017]
introduce a degree of preference heterogeneity which delivers a downward sloping demand
curve at the city level. Taking an assumed value for the elasticity of population to housing
costs, the model predicts that housing productivity reductions lead to larger increases in
prices and smaller decreases in land values, compared with the homogeneous preferences
case. The reason for the difference is that the quantity reduction pushes the marginal
resident up the demand curve where they have a higher willingness to pay resulting in both
higher prices and higher land values, compared with a flat demand curve.
The empirical implication of this is that the quality of life step will now capture both
(a) quality of life increases due to amenity changes and (b) quality of life increases of the
marginal resident due to quantity rationing. The empirical implication is not an identification
problem as such—since the quality of life for the marginal resident continues to be correctly
identified—but rather a problem to do with interpreting the quality of life parameter in the
welfare calculations. Clearly, using (b) as a welfare increase misses whatever happens to the
residents who would have been living in the city had it not been quantity-rationed.
A related problem is that of household sorting. Sorting occurs if conservation area des-
ignation leads to a migration of residents into a city who have a higher willingness to pay
for that type of quality of life amenity compared with existing residents. As before, the
quality of life effect for the marginal resident will continue to be correctly identified in that
empirical step. However, it leaves open the possibility that the quality of life effect has an
additional component (c) a quality of life increase of the marginal resident due to changes
in the willingness to pay as a result of sorting.
If effects (b) or (c) represent a relatively large proportion of the overall quality of life
estimate than the model would likely be over-estimating the welfare benefits of conservation.
The welfare conclusions are justified to the extent that the actual sorting and quantity
effects of designation are relatively small over the time period considered. Such effects
would be small if price adjustment to the quality of life effects is immediate (since residents
value security over the future character of their neighbourhood) but if adjustment through
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quantities and sorting between cities is limited and occurring over a longer time frame.
In order to somewhat alleviate the concerns related to quantity, I conduct a regression of
conservation areas on the number of dwelling units at both the local and city level. In Table
3 I show that conservation area designations did not impact on the number of dwelling units
in England over 1997–2007, either at the city-level (HMA) or at the very local level (output
area).13 However, there remains the possibility that conservation areas impact on some other
measure of housing quantity such as floorspace. Overall then, whilst the assumption that
sorting and quantity effects are limited may be reasonable, the existence of large effects
cannot be empirically ruled out and the welfare results are therefore caveated accordingly.
3 Data
3.1 Housing market areas
The empirical analysis is conducted at the housing market area (HMA) level. These areas
are defined by DCLG [2010] using a grouping algorithm applied to ward-level census data
on commuting patterns, house prices and migration flows. The use of commuting patterns
makes them similar to the better-known travel-to-work area (TTWA) definition. However,
HMAs have a higher commuting self-containment rate of 77.5%, compared with just 66.7%
for the TTWAs [DCLG, 2010]. For this reason in particular, they are considered a better
empirical counterpart to the theoretical j-locations. In addition, HMAs are defined such that
similar houses have a similar within-area price (after adjusting for observed characteristics).
Furthermore, HMAs have a 50% closure rate for migration flows, implying a good deal of
both within- and between-market integration.
For much of the data described below, I aggregate from local authorities (LAs) based
on the relationship mapped in Figure 3. I use weighted aggregation to address potential
spatial mismatch. In order to improve the precision of the house price index, I drop eight (of
74) HMAs – those with fewer than 100 housing transactions per year.14 Since the greatest
period of overlap of the different data is 1997–2007, the final panel dataset has T = 11
and N = 66. While this is a fairly small N, any loss of precision is worth it to ensure
self-contained areas prescribed by the theory. The wider costs and benefits of designation
13Output areas (OAs) are the smallest geographical units available for most UK data. They cover 0.78
square kilometres on average, which is only three times the size of the average conservation area (0.26 square
kilometres). In comparison, HMAs cover 1,762 square kilometres, on average.
14This is an arbitrary cut-off point. Results for the full dataset are presented in robustness checks in
Appendix B in the web appendix.
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may only be fully captured at the market level. As described in the introduction, part of
the benefits of conservation may be from living in a city with lots of well-preserved heritage
neighbourhoods. On the cost side, designation that lowers productivity in one part of the city
will impact on prices elsewhere in the city, since the units offer access to the same labour
market and are therefore substitutable. However, in Appendix B in the web appendix I
demonstrate that the approach is robust to using LAs as the unit of observation.
All variables used in the analysis are expressed as log deviations from the national average
in each year, denoted by tilde (e.g. p˜). For each variable, I first log-transform it and
then subtract the mean of the log-transformed values across HMAs in each year. For the
productivity shifters, I additionally normalise the standard deviation to one. Descriptive
statistics for the panel dataset are given in Table 1.
3.2 House prices
The production function relies on the theoretical concept of ‘housing services’, which repre-
sents the flow of value derived from physical housing for the occupant. Housing quality and
housing quantity are assumed to be entirely substitutable in that each simply delivers a flow
of ‘services’ to the occupant. This assumption is a useful simplification since it implies that
the unit price of housing services can be estimated from house prices in a hedonic approach
that controls for housing quality and quantity.
House prices for 1,087,896 transactions in England over the period 1995–2010 come from
Nationwide, the largest building society in the UK. All transactions in the Nationwide data
are for owner-occupied units.15 In addition to the price paid, the data has property char-
acteristics including postcode location, which is used to identify which HMA the transacted
unit belongs to. The house price index is computed by regressing the log of the transaction
price p for unit-i in HMA-j and year-t on a vector of property characteristics Xijt and a set
of HMA-year indicator variables:
pijt = Xijtβ + ϕjt(HMAj × Y EARt) + ijt (4)
The house price index is then constructed by taking the predicted HMA-year effects ϕˆjt and
15This implies that the quality of life index will reflect homeowner spatial equilibrium only. However,
during the time period considered, private renters represented only around 10% of households, whereas
homeowners represented nearly 70%. The small share of private renters and the fact that rents are likely
to be closely related to house prices means that a homeowner spatial equilibrium is likely to be broadly
representative.
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subtracting the national average in each year, i.e. p˜jt = ϕˆjt − ¯ˆϕt. The result represents log
deviations from the national average since house prices are log transformed for the hedonic
regression. The results of the hedonic regression and a brief discussion of the coefficients are
presented in Appendix A in the web appendix. Since the distribution of observed transactions
within each HMA-year may differ from the actual distribution of housing stock in the HMA,
each observation is weighted by the LA dwellings count in 2003 divided by the LA-year
transaction count.16
3.3 Land values
Residential land values are obtained from the Valuation Office Agency (VOA). The land
values are produced for the Property Market Report which has been released biannually
since 1982. Land values for the full set of local authorities were, however, not made available
until recently (2014). As such, this research is one of the first empirical applications of the
full dataset. The assessments are based on a combination of expert opinion and observed
values for transactions of land. The values are assessed for small sites (< 2 ha), bulk land (>
2 ha) and flat sites (for building flats) for vacant land with outline planning permission. In
order to produce an overall land value index I adjust for the price differences by site category
using a regression discussed in Appendix A in the web appendix. Notably, the regression
results show that bulk land is considerably cheaper (by 4.9% to 11.2%) than small plots in
every year. It is reassuring that the valuations conform to the well-documented ‘plattage
effect’ [by e.g. Colwell and Sirmans, 1993]. In order to validate the valuations, I make use
of transaction data in the form of land auctions between 2001–2012.17 There is a very
high correlation with the valuation data as discussed in Appendix A in the web appendix.
Land valuations for 1995–1998 are reported using a slightly different LA definition due to a
local government reorganisation that occurred over this period. I converted the earlier LA
definition to the new definition using the relevant lookup table.18 I then took the mean of
the biannually reported land values and aggregated them to the HMA level, again using the
distribution of housing stock in 2003 as weights. As a final step, I computed log differentials.
16Further detail on the weighting procedure and regressions without weights are reported in Appendix B
in the web appendix. The main results without weights are similar.
17It is not possible to use these transactions as the main source of data for land values since in many of
the smaller cities there are not enough observations.
18Most LAs were unaffected. Of the original 366, 21 were merged into nine new areas, making the new
total 354 LAs.
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3.4 Construction costs
In order to capture the costs of non-land inputs to construction an index of rebuilding costs
was obtained from the Regional Supplement to the Guide to House Rebuilding Cost published
by the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS). Rebuilding cost is an approximation
of how much it would cost to completely rebuild a standard unit of residential housing had
it been entirely destroyed. The index takes into account the cost of construction labour
(wages), materials costs, machine hire, etc., and is considered to be an appropriate measure
of the price of non-land inputs to housing. The index is also reflective of local build quality.19
The data is based on hedonic regression using observed tender prices for construction projects
and the sample size of tenders is given with each factor. I make use of location adjustment
factors that are available annually from 1997–2008 at the LA-level and take into account the
local variations in costs. To my knowledge this data has not been used before in empirical
analysis at this level of detail. The location factors were scanned from hard copies and
digitised using optical character recognition software. The separate years were then matched
to form a panel dataset. Some LAs were missing from the data, especially in the earlier years.
However, a higher tier geography (corresponding in most cases with counties) was recorded
completely, enabling a simple filling procedure described in Appendix A in the web appendix.
Finally, the LA level data were aggregated to HMAs weighted by dwelling stock, and then
log differenced.
3.5 Conservation area designation
A spatial dataset of conservation areas (CAs) was obtained from English Heritage. The
dataset contains polygons that map the borders of all CAs in England on the British National
Grid coordinate system. The full dataset has only been used once before in empirical analysis
by Ahlfeldt et al. [2017]. The data include the date of designation, which lies between 1966
and 2011. Using this information I calculated in a geographical information systems (GIS)
environment the share of land in each HMA that was covered by CAs in each year over 1997–
2007. Figure 4 plots the initial designation share in 1997 against the change in share over
the study period. The chart shows variation in both the initial share and the change over the
period. Although the changes are small as a proportion of all land, they may still have large
productivity or quality of life effects as outlined below. The CA designation share is first
19This is beneficial since otherwise unobserved build quality would lead to designation being associated
with higher house prices for given construction costs. Note that time-invariant build quality differences are
captured by fixed effects in the cost function.
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computed at the LA level in order to be aggregated to HMAs weighted by dwelling stock,
ensuring all the data are produced comparably. The log land shares are then normalised
to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one which is achieved by taking log-
differences around the national average and then dividing by the standard deviation in each
year. Such ‘z-values’ are created for each of the housing productivity factors to ensure the
effects on log costs are comparable.
The designated share of all HMA land is a proxy for the extent to which designation
might impact on housing productivity or quality of life. So while the increase in designated
land area over the period for the average HMA is relatively small, at 0.13%, the actual ef-
fects may be much larger.20 A specific reason for this is that housing productivity effects will
depend on the impact of designation on marginal developments which may disproportion-
ately occur in existing residential areas where designations are more common. Moreover,
designations might occur specifically to ensure that potential new developments maintain
the neighbourhood character. On the benefits side, designations may also have quality of
effects outside of the designated areas themselves via spillovers as documented, for example,
by Ahlfeldt et al. [2017].
3.6 Planning restrictions and other housing productivity factors
In order to control for the underlying regularity restrictiveness in each city, the share of
planning applications that are refused in each year from 1997–2007 was obtained. This data
was first used by Hilber and Vermeulen [2014] to analyse the effect of planning restrictiveness
on housing costs in England. The LA data were aggregated to HMAs weighted by dwelling
stock. The variation in refusal rates is volatile over time such that it is unlikely that every
fluctuation represents actual changes in planning restrictiveness. The data were, therefore,
smoothed in order to eliminate the short-term noise while keeping the longer-run trends
in planning restrictiveness. This smoothing was done by regressing the refusal share on a
binomial time trend and using the predicted values.
In order to estimate whether designation effects vary with geographic constraints, I com-
pute the undevelopable share of land within 25km of each HMA centroid, following Saiz
[2010].21 Developable land is defined as land that is flat (< 15 degree slope) and dry (solid
20In fact, the average increase of 0.13% in designated land share already looks much larger when looking
at the proportion of designated buildings, according to the Nationwide transaction dataset – this is three
and a half times larger at 0.45%.
21Saiz [2010] uses 50km circles around U.S. MSA centroids – whereas I define 25km circles to adjust for
the smaller size of English HMAs. The average area of a U.S. MSA is about 7,000 km2, which corresponds
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land covers). To calculate the slopes I use the OS Terrain 50 topography dataset which is a
50m grid of the UK with land surface altitudes recorded for the centroid of each grid square.
I calculate the slope in the steepest direction for each grid square and if this is greater than
15 degrees then the 50m grid square is defined as undevelopable. To identify dry land I use
the Land Cover Map 2000, which is a 25m grid for the whole of Great Britain where each
square is assigned to one of 26 broad categories of land cover. The grid square is defined as
undevelopable if it is water, bog, marsh, etc., following Hilber and Vermeulen [2014]. The
final undevelopable land share is computed for each HMA as the total land area that is not
developable divided by the total area in the 25-km circle.
3.7 Quality of life index
I construct a quality of life index according to equation (3) as follows:
QoL1jt = 0.31× p˜jt − (1− 0.225)× 0.64× w˜jt (5)
where 0.31 is the average share of expenditure on housing, which comes from the Expenditure
and Food Surveys 2001–2007. In different empirical specifications, I demonstrate robustness
to using different values for the housing expenditure share, as well as using shares that vary
by average city income. The price differential p˜jt is the same as that used in the cost function
step, computed via hedonic regression. The annual wages w˜jt come from the Annual Survey
of Hours and Earnings at the local authority level and are aggregated (weighted by the
number of jobs) to HMAs before taking log differentials. The average marginal income tax
rate of 0.225 was computed using data from the HM Revenue and Customs for 2005/06
and the average share of income from wages of 0.64 is from the Department for Work and
Pensions for 2005/06. I estimate additional specifications where the marginal income tax
rate depends on the average income specific to each HMA-year observation and where the
share of income from wages varies across regions. The results are robust to such changes
as presented in Appendix B in the web appendix suggesting the use of average figures is
suitable. A ranking of HMAs according to this quality of life index is presented in Appendix
A in the web appendix.
to the area of a circle with a radius of around 50km and is perhaps the reasoning behind Saiz’s choice of
radius. Since the average HMA in England is about 1,800 km2, an appropriately sized circle would have a
radius of about 25km.
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4 Empirical strategy and identification
My empirical strategy is based on the two-step approach of Albouy and Ehrlich [2012]. In
the first step I estimate a cost function for housing production. The unit value of housing is
regressed on land values, construction prices and productivity shifters, including designation.
In the second step the quality of life index is regressed on housing productivity factors to
reveal the overall welfare impact of designation. My identification strategy is based on
implementing a panel fixed effects approach and instrumenting for designation with a shift-
share.
4.1 First step: Cost function
Following Albouy and Ehrlich [2012] and Christensen et al. [1973] I first estimate an unre-
stricted translog cost function:
p˜jt = β1r˜jt + β2v˜jt + β3(r˜jt)2 + β4(v˜jt)2 + β5(r˜jtv˜jt) + piR˜jt + δD˜jt + fj + ujt (6)
where R˜jt is the predicted refusal rate and D˜jt is the conservation area designation share.
The fixed effects fj capture all time-invariant productivity shifters, such as geographic con-
straints. The parameter δ is an inconsistent estimate of the housing productivity impact of
conservation areas if designation is correlated with the error term. According to the model,
quality of life factors are absent from ujt as they are capitalised in land values r˜jt. However,
unobserved housing productivity shocks may be correlated with designation as discussed in
the identification strategy below.
In this panel format, the log-differentials are taken around the national average in each
year t. These differentials are equivalent to using year effects in the regression; however, I
prefer to stick to the format suggested by the theory.22 Imposing the restrictions of CRS:
β1 = 1 − β2; β3 = β4 = −β5/2 makes this equivalent to a second-order approximation of
equation (2) and imposing the further restrictions of β3 = β4 = β5 = 0 makes this a first-
order estimation i.e. a Cobb-Douglas cost function [Fuss and McFadden, 1978]. Comparing
equation (6) with equation (2) reveals that housing productivity is given by:
A˜Yj = −piR˜jt − δD˜jt − fj − ujt (7)
22Taking differentials is necessary in certain parts of the model, e.g. to eliminate the interest rate i or
reservation utility u.
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Housing productivity is the (negative of) observed and unobserved city attributes that impact
on unit house prices after taking into account input prices. If designation impacts negatively
on housing productivity then its coefficient δ is expected to be positive i.e. it will raise house
prices above what is predicted by factor prices alone.
4.2 Second step: Quality of life
Increasing the cost of housing is not the intended effect of designation. Rather, conserva-
tion areas reduce housing productivity in order to preserve or improve the attractiveness of
neighbourhoods. The second step investigates the demand side effect of conservation areas
by relating the same productivity shifters, including designation, to a measure of quality of
life. The regression takes the form:
Q˜jt = µ1R˜jt + µ2D˜jt + µ3ujt + gj + εjt (8)
where gj are fixed effects that capture time-invariant quality of life factors. The parameter
µ3 gives the relationship between designation and quality of life. According to the model,
productivity factors are absent from εjt, despite the fact that house prices go into the quality
of life index. They are absent because higher wages will compensate for higher prices from
productivity factors in order to maintain spatial equilibrium. However, unobserved quality
of life factors may lead to a bias of µ2, as discussed in the identification strategy below.
If conservation areas increase quality of life then µ2 will be positive. The coefficient gives
the quality of life impact expressed as a share of expenditure. Combining this with the
estimate from the first step gives the total welfare as µ2−(0.31×δ), since 0.31 is the housing
expenditure share.
4.3 Identification
There are two features to the identification strategy. Firstly, I make use of the panel nature
of the data by estimating a fixed effects model. Secondly, I combine fixed effects with a time-
varying instrument for designation based on the Bartik [1991] shift-share. It is worth noting
that identification here focusses only on the impacts of designation. Consistent estimates of
the land cost share are obtained by instrumenting land values in an alternative specification
outlined in subsection 4.5, but this step is neither necessary nor desirable for consistent
estimation of the impacts of designation, as explained in that subsection.
18
Fixed effects estimation alone provides a major improvement over pooled OLS estima-
tion by controlling for time-invariant housing productivity factors or quality of life factors.
For example, on the cost function side, a time-invariant factor such as soil type may both
affect housing productivity and be correlated with today’s conservation areas (if it drove the
location of historical settlements). Likewise on the quality of life side, many urban amenities
such as job accessibility, natural factors and cultural amenities are relatively fixed over the
period of one decade. Furthermore, the fixed effects models removes any effect from unob-
servable housing characteristics that biased the house price index in the hedonic regression
stage. Thus, they help to deal with a common problem with estimating housing production
functions [Combes et al., 2016]. I additionally include individual HMA trends to capture
the effect of unobservable trends in housing productivity and quality of life factors that may
be related to designation. A relationship in trends could come about if, for example, trends
in unobservable housing productivity or quality of life factors and trends in designation are
both related to the initial heritage endowment of a city. In terms of the theoretical model,
estimation of a fixed effects model assumes spatial equilibrium in each year.23
The fixed effects strategy does not help when unobservables are time-variant. To illus-
trate, consider the example of a city with ongoing transport improvements that increase
housing productivity and/or quality of life. Such improvements may also be the result of (or
may result in) gentrification, which itself has been empirically demonstrated to lead to des-
ignation [Ahlfeldt et al., 2017]. In general, changes in city attributes that impact on housing
productivity or quality of life will likely be interlinked with gentrification and, therefore,
designation. To address this I employ an instrumental variable approach similar in spirit to
a Bartik instrument [Bartik, 1991]. The instrument provides HMA-level ‘shocks’ that are a
weighted average of the national level designation share of buildings in different build date
categories. The weights used for a given HMA are the share of its dwelling stock in each
build date band. Specifically, the instrument is computed as:
Zjt =
14∑
b=1
Dj−1,btHjb0 (9)
23This will be the case if prices adjust quickly to quality of life changes. This assumption seems reason-
able since consumers will immediately be willing to pay more for locations with improved amenity value.
Theoretically, all prices (house prices, land values and construction costs) will immediately reflect changes
to housing productivity and quality of life due to market competition. For example, developers buying land
will pay a price that takes into account the latest information on what their buildings will sell for. The
available evidence shows that house prices do respond quickly to amenity changes. For example, Gibbons
and Machin [2005] show house prices in 2000 and 2001 adjusting to rail improvements from 1999.
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where Zjt is the counterfactual designation share in HMA-j and year t, Dj−1,bt is the desig-
nation share in each age band b for all HMAs other than HMA-j, and Hjb0 is the initial share
of dwelling stock in HMA-j in age band. The national level designation share in each of the
age bands are based on the Nationwide transactions data and are described in Appendix A
in the web appendix.
The counterfactual designation share is expected to be a relevant predictor of HMA
designation even conditional on fixed effects and trend controls. National changes in the
designation share for buildings of certain build periods capture shifts in preferences for
heritage. If an HMA has a high proportion of buildings in those build periods then the
chances of designation are increased. Relevance is confirmed by the F-stats in Table 4 and
Table 6 for the cost function and quality of life regressions, respectively. Furthermore, the
instruments are significant and (mostly) have the expected signs in the first-stage regressions
in tables presented in Appendix A in the web appendix. The charts in Figure 5 illustrate
the counterfactual designation share and the actual designation share conditional on HMA
fixed effects and trend interactions for a selection of cities.24
In order to be a valid instrument, the counterfactual designation share must be orthogonal
to the error terms ujt and εjt. The argument for exogeneity is that changes in the national
level designation share are unrelated to anything going on at the individual city level, like
gentrification. In order to capture general trends in unobservables that might be correlated
with the initial stock, I include a trend variable interacted with the initial value (in 1997)
for the instrument. In order to capture further possible trends I include interactions of a
trend variable with city characteristics: the initial designation share, the initial refusal rate,
the city population, protected land share, and undevelopable land share.25 Therefore, the
identifying assumption is that the instrument is unrelated to unobserved shocks to housing
productivity or quality of life, conditional on controlling for trends related to the initial
stock (as captured in the initial value of the instrument) and trends related to other city
characteristics.
The exclusionary restriction requires that the instrument not lead directly to changes in
the outcome variable. The exclusionary restriction could be violated if national-level changes
in preferences for buildings of an HMA lead to the gentrification of that HMA, which in turns
24The designation share in these figures may appear to have a slight tendency towards a downward trend,
however, this is just due to the selection of cities. The average trend is in fact zero after conditioning on
trend interactions.
25Note that individual HMA trends are not used in order to ensure the instrument is relevant in the first
stages.
20
impacts on housing productivity or quality of life. I argue, however, that such a correlation is
unlikely to continue conditional on HMA fixed effects and trend controls. Gentrification is a
complex process that depends on many more factors than the build date of the dwelling stock.
In Table 2 I present evidence to support this argument. Here, the designation share and the
counterfactual designation share are regressed on a measure of the share of residents who
hold a degree certificate. This dependent variable comes from the UK census and proxies
gentrification of a city. The positive and significant relationship with designation in the
pooled OLS model implies that gentrification and designation are indeed interlinked. The
size of this coefficient decreases as fixed effects and trends are introduced. However, for the
instrument there is no relationship at all in either of the models. Given that gentrification
is the most likely source of unobserved shocks, it is reassuring that it is not related to the
instrument.
Another potential violation of the exclusionary restriction is if the instrument captures
increased valuations placed on specific property characteristics. As it stands, these are not
controlled for in the hedonic regression. In order to deal with this, for the IV models only, I
re-estimate the hedonic regression with interactions between year effects and the build date
categories. In a robustness check in Appendix B in the web appendix, I demonstrate that
the results are not sensitive to this change.
4.4 Alternative specifications
I estimate three alternative specifications. Firstly, I investigate whether the effects of desig-
nation depend on the quantity of available land around a city. If there is an abundance of
land, designation may have less effect on productivity as developers can easily build outside
the city. To test this idea I create two dummy variables, one for HMAs that are above-average
on the Saiz index and one for those below average. I interact the designation variable with
each of these dummies and include the interactions in the two regression steps in place of the
uninteracted version of the designation variable. These separate dummy interactions give
the effect on housing productivity or quality of life in HMAs that have a scarcity of land or
an abundance of land. Secondly, I investigate whether the benefits/costs of designation take
time to materialise. I create a cumulative version of the designation share that is the sum
of the designation share across periods, i.e. Cjt =
T∑
t=1
Djt. If this is significant in either step
it may indicate that the productivity or quality of life effects build up over time. Thirdly, I
investigate whether designation is associated with factor non-neutral productivity shifts. I
follow Albouy and Ehrlich [2012] by interacting the designation share with the factor price
21
difference. This interaction captures whether designation impacts on the productivity of
land more than it does on the productivity of non-land.
4.5 Consistent estimation of the land cost share
Since the land cost share is of independent interest it should be estimated consistently. The
land cost share will be inconsistent if there are unobserved housing productivity factors in
the error term of equation (6) since according to the model these capitalise in land values.
The theory provides guidance as to a potential instrument since both quality of life and
non-housing productivity factors will also capitalise into land values. If any of these factors
are unrelated to housing productivity then they could serve as suitable instruments.
I create such an instrument based on the original Bartik [1991] shift-share where initial
local employment shares across industries act as weights on national level changes in gross
value added in those industries. This instrument predicts local changes in productivity
(which capitalise into land values) that arise from national-level shocks that are unrelated
to local-level housing productivity factors (conditional on city-level fixed effects and trends).
The initial local employment shares come from the 1991 UK Census [Office of Population
Censuses and Surveys, 1991]. This Census is a number of years before the panel begins to
remain as exogenous as possible. The annual national level GVA over 1997–2007 comes from
Cambridge Econometrics [2013]. Both are available for some 30 different industries.
Instrumentation of land values is kept to a separate specification because such instru-
mentation prevents the cost function of equation (6) from properly disentangling the housing
productivity from quality of life effects. If land values are predicted by an exogenous fac-
tor then they do not include variation as a result of capitalised quality of life effects from
conservation area designation. These effects will therefore instead be captured in δ, making
it a mixture of quality of life and housing productivity effects, and difficult to interpret. In
effect, for the cost function to work as desired, land values are required to be endogenous.
5 Results
5.1 Housing cost function
Figure 6 plots mean house price differentials ( ¯˜pj) against mean land value differentials (¯˜rj)
and serves as an introduction to the regression results. The slope of the linear trend suggests
a land cost share of φL = β1 = 0.436 and the binomial slope suggests convexity (β3 = 0.076)
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and an elasticity of substitution less than one. Holding all else constant the HMAs above
(below) these lines have lower (higher) than average housing productivity. However, some
of the price differences will be explained by construction costs. Furthermore, construction
costs are correlated with land values, therefore, the land cost share itself is biased.
Table 4 presents the results from the panel fixed effects and IV estimation of equation
(7). I estimate the Cobb-Douglas and translog production functions with and without CRS
restrictions. The key parameter is conservation area designation, and this is positive and
significant across all specifications, implying that conservation areas lead to higher house
prices by reducing housing productivity. A standard deviation increase (an increase of 0.013)
in designation is associated with a 0.159–0.169 house price effect in the fixed effects models
and a 0.433–0.600 effect in the instrumented models. Since the fixed effects results are
inconsistent under the existence of time-variant unobservables and since the first stage F-
stats indicate the instrument is not weak, the IV estimates are the preferred results. The
estimates imply that designation over 1997–2007 would have increased house prices (via
reduced productivity) by 4.3–6.0% for the average HMA.26 The instrumented estimates are
significantly larger than their uninstrumented versions, implying that unobservables that
are positively related to designation (such as gentrification) are positively related to housing
productivity (i.e. reduce house prices for given input prices). As discussed in the empirical
strategy this could be the case if gentrification is associated with, for example, transport
improvements at the city level that increase productivity in the housing sector.27
The refusal rate control is also positive and significant in all models, implying planning
restrictiveness decreases housing productivity. Here, the magnitude of the coefficient in the
instrumented models suggests an increase in house prices of 6.0–7.8% over the period.28 How-
ever, the refusals data has been smoothed making the coefficients unreliable. Furthermore,
only the designation variable has been instrumented.
The land cost share is around 0.17-0.18 in all columns, which compares with a land cost
share of 0.35–0.37 when estimating a housing cost function for the U.S. [Albouy and Ehrlich,
26The average HMA increased its designation share by about one tenth of the (between-group) standard
deviation over the period 1997–2007. One tenth is multiplied by the coefficients to arrive at the average effect
on prices. As argued in the data section, the increase in designation of 0.13% of all HMA land may produce
large productivity effects if it disproportionately affects marginal developments. Therefore, the estimated
effect sizes are plausible.
27Transport is also a likely quality of life amenity that would increase house prices via the quality of life
route. However, it would also increase land values and therefore be captured in the land cost share of the
cost function step.
28The effect implied by the coefficients of 2.6-3.4% multiplied by the average increase in refusals of 2.3
(between-group) standard deviations.
23
2012]. However, as outlined in Appendix B in the web appendix my preferred estimate of
the land cost share is 0.29 after instrumenting for land values. The elasticity of substitution
is 0.755 in the (restricted translog) panel fixed effects model and 0.213 in the instrumented
model (compared with 0.367 for the U.S. in Albouy and Ehrlich [2012]). The parameter from
the instrumented model falls at the lower end of the range of estimates in the literature,
however, a robustness check in Appendix B in the web appendix using only new properties
finds it increases to 0.402 which is the preferred estimate of the elasticity of substitution
since new properties will not be subject to a depreciation of the capital component of the
cost of housing, as argued by Ahlfeldt and McMillen [2014].
In terms of model selection, I focus on the tests of the restrictions in the instrumented
models. The Cobb-Douglas restrictions are easily rejected in columns (5) and (6). The CRS
restrictions are not rejected in column (6) but are rejected in column (8). Although CRS
is rejected in column (8) I choose to proceed with the restricted translog model assumed in
the theory. This decision is also justifiable given the results of interest do not differ greatly
between restricted and unrestricted models.
5.2 Alternative specifications
Table 5 presents the alternative specifications of the restricted translog cost function. The
baseline fixed effects and instrumented models are repeated in columns (1) and (5) for com-
parison. The first stages in Appendix B in the web appendix indicate that the instrumental
variable approach encounters varying degrees of success across these alternative specifica-
tions. Therefore, in cases where the instrument appears to fail, evidence from the ‘second-
best’ fixed effects model will be drawn upon to form tentative findings.
Columns (2) and (6) report the results for designation interacted with dummy variables
for the Saiz undevelopable land index. In the instrumented model, there is a surprising
negative effect for the land-abundant HMAs. However, the instrument has an unexpected
sign for the subsample of land-abundant HMAs, suggesting this result may be disregarded.
Instead, I focus on the fixed effects results where the productivity effect of designation in land
constrained HMAs is larger than the baseline effect. For HMAs with plenty of land, however,
the effect is far smaller and is statistically insignificant. Therefore, the results from the fixed
effects model imply there is a greater effect of designation on housing productivity where
there is a lack of land availability. This result conforms to expectations, since regulating
development in conservation areas should have a smaller impact on productivity if there is
an abundance of land elsewhere in the city.
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Columns (3) and (7) report the factor non-neutral specification. Again, the first stage
coefficient of the instrument has the wrong sign for the non-neutral variable, suggesting
that instrumentation is not successful in this model. In the fixed effects model, however,
the designation parameter is unaffected by the inclusion of the interaction with the factor
price difference. The interacted variable itself is insignificant, implying factor neutrality is a
reasonable assumption. This result is in line with that found by Albouy and Ehrlich [2012]
for regulation across U.S. MSAs.
Finally, columns (4) and (8) report the effect of the cumulative version of the designation
variable. The variable is insignificant in the fixed effects specification but significant in the
instrumented model. Since the instrument is strong, the instrumented version is preferred,
suggesting that the housing productivity effects of designation may increase over time.
The alternative specifications support the main result of the cost function step that desig-
nation increases housing costs by reducing housing productivity. The additional specification
suggest that the effect may decrease with land availability and may be cumulative with time.
The results also support the assumption of a factor neutral housing productivity impact.
5.3 Quality of life and conservation areas
Table 6 presents the estimates from the quality of life regression of equation (8). The
same productivity shifters are used as in the respective first step cost functions. Columns
(1)–(4) use the fixed effects model in both the cost function and quality of life steps and
columns (5)–(8) use the instrumented model in both steps. In general, the parameters for
the designation variables are positive and significant, implying designation increases quality
of life. In the baseline fixed effects model of column (1), a one point decrease in designation
is associated with a 0.077 point increase in quality of life expressed as a share of expenditure.
Instrumenting designation in column (5) reveals a similar quality of life effect of 0.071. A
similar estimate makes sense if designation was associated with trends in both positive and
negative quality of life factors.
As stated, the overall welfare effect is computed as the quality of life effect minus the hous-
ing expenditure share times the housing productivity effect. Using the baseline fixed effects
specification results in a welfare effect of 0.077− (0.31× 0.159) = 0.028 and using the base-
line instrumental variables specification results in a welfare effect of 0.071− (0.31× 0.433) =
−0.063. The fixed effects model suggests that designations are welfare-improving, whereas
the instrumented model suggests designation worsens welfare. Since the fixed effects results
are inconsistent under the presence of time-variant unobservables, and since the F-stats
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indicate the instrument is strong, the instrumented model is preferred. The average HMA
increased its designation share by 1/10 points over the period, suggesting an effect on welfare
of -0.63% of expenditure.29 Given the mean income of £22,800 in 2004–05 this is equivalent
to an income reduction of about £1,500 over the study period. As discussed in the theory,
the validity of the welfare effect relies on there being relatively little quantity adjustments
or sorting. In the case where such effects are large, the welfare benefits of designation are
overestimated, implying that the welfare loss from designation is an underestimate.
Further, it should be noted that I have computed the overall welfare effect using point
estimates. In order to obtain confidence intervals in another specification I estimate both
steps together using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). This approach allows for com-
putation of the welfare effect as a linear combination of coefficients across models. Following
this approach implies a 90% confidence interval with a lower bound of -0.005 and an upper
bound -0.126. Essentially, the welfare loss could range from almost zero to around double
the point estimate.
For planning refusals, the quality of life effects are very small in the instrumented specifi-
cation. Given that the housing productivity effects were negative, this suggests that planning
refusals are welfare-decreasing. However, since the planning variable is volatile and is not
instrumented, this should not be taken at face value.
Columns (2) and (6) examine the quality of life effects when interacting the designation
variable with the Saiz index dummies. As in the cost function step, the first stage for land
abundant cities has an unexpected sign, suggesting that instrumentation was unsuccessful
and that the fixed effects results are preferred. The fixed effects model shows a significant
positive impact on quality of life for areas with land scarcity but an insignificant effect in
areas with a land abundance. The coefficient for land scarce areas implies slightly larger
quality of life effects than in the baseline specification. Together with the first step, these
results imply designations will have both larger housing productivity and larger quality of
life effects in cities with a scarcity of developable land. This result makes sense since it
is unlikely that designation will have quality of life effects without impacting on housing
productivity.
Columns (3) and (7) investigate the quality of life effects allowing for non-factor-neutral
productivity shifts from designation. As with the first step, the instrumentation appears
to fail when predicting the non-neutral designation variable. I therefore concentrate on
29This effect refers to an average homeowner in a city, and there may be a distribution of effects depending
on whether the household lives inside or nearby a conservation area.
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the fixed effect results where the substantive conclusions are unchanged from the baseline
specification. This result supports the evidence from the cost function step that indicated
that factor neutrality was a reasonable assumption.
Finally, columns (4) and (8) investigate the quality of life effects for the cumulative version
of the designation variable. The cumulative designation effects in the instrumented speci-
fication are larger than the baseline effects, but the overall welfare effect remains negative
(although smaller in magnitude).
5.4 Robustness checks
In order to check the sensitivity of these results, I estimate a number of robustness checks
in Appendix B in the web appendix. These checks are (i) unweighted aggregation of the
data to the HMA-level, (ii) using only new properties (<5 years old),30 (iii) using the full
sample of 74 HMAs (not excluding the eight with few transactions), (iv) using a quality of
life measure that uses regional variation in the marginal tax rate and the share of wages
in income, (v) using a quality of life measure with a high expenditure share on housing,
(vi) using a quality of life measure with a low expenditure share on housing, (vii) using a
quality of life measure where the expenditure share varies according to city income, and
(viii) repeating the IV specification using prices from the hedonic model without date bands
interacted with year effects. As discussed in Appendix B, the broad results are robust to
these changes. In Appendix B, I also demonstrate that the approach is robust to using local
authorities (LAs) as the unit of observation.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence of the effects of conservation area designation on economic
welfare. I constructed a unique panel dataset for English housing market areas (HMAs) that
resemble city regions. In the first step of the empirical strategy I estimated the housing
productivity effect of designation using a cost function approach. Here, I regressed house
prices on factor prices (land and construction costs) and productivity shifters (including
designation). In the second step I estimated the quality of life benefits and the overall
welfare impact of designation. I regressed a quality of life index on housing productivity
30Using only new properties follows Ahlfeldt and McMillen [2014] who argue that accurate estimates of
the land cost share and elasticity of substitution will be biased by a depreciation of the capital component
for older housing stock.
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factors used in the first step. I implemented both stages using panel fixed effects and IV
approaches.
The main results imply that conservation area designations (in England, 1997–2007) are
associated with both negative housing productivity effects and positive quality of life effects.
In the cost function step, increases in designation share lead to higher house prices (compared
with land values) indicating a negative shift in housing productivity. The second step reveals
that designation leads to increases in quality of life. However, the overall welfare effect is
negative in the instrumented and preferred specification. This result is in line with previous
evidence that suggests housing regulation is welfare-decreasing.
The negative welfare impact of designation over 1997–2007 makes sense if there are con-
cave returns to designation. The areas most worthy of protection may have been designated
in the policy’s first 30 years of operation (1966–1996). More recent designations then would
be of a less distinctive heritage character, and perhaps only of local significance. Designa-
tion has continued despite large costs incurred at the housing market level, since, as argued
by Ahlfeldt et al. [2017], designation status is largely determined by local homeowners who
stand to gain from the localised benefits of the policy.
Nevertheless, though, there may be significant heterogeneity in the quality of conserva-
tion areas over the studied period and the results of this paper do not suggest that all of
these conservation areas reduced welfare. Furthermore, there may be significant heterogene-
ity across individuals, for example, the designation would be more welfare-improving for
individuals with a greater than average preference for heritage or with a less than average
expenditure share on housing. Overall, though, the results suggest that the average house-
hold would have been better off without the average conservation area being designated in
the period between 1997 and 2007 in England. This overall welfare improvement of these
designation not being made would have been equivalent to about £1,500 per household.
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Figure 2: Housing productivity example
Notes: This figure is an adaptation of Figure 1A from Albouy and Ehrlich [2012].
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Figure 3: Housing markets areas over local authorities
Notes: Map P11.4 from Geography of housing market areas by DCLG [2010].
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Figure 4: Initial designation share against change for housing market areas (HMAs)
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Figure 5: Actual designation against counterfactual designation for selected HMAs
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Figure 6: House prices vs land values for English Housing Market Areas
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for panel dataset
Overall statistics Between-group Within-group
Mean Sd Min Max Sd Min Max Sd Min Max
Variables (standard)
House price (£000s) 118.2 52.90 41.6 345.9 27.30 76.6 220.2 45.43 7.077 243.8
Land value (£000s / ha) 1486.5 1046.2 183.4 7964.4 740.1 600.1 5197.3 744.5 -1420.7 4253.7
Const. cost index 136.7 26.31 93.1 207.0 7.025 123.2 160.4 25.37 93.20 193.7
Designation share 0.0176 0.0136 0.000004 0.0712 0.0136 0.000004 0.0711 0.00126 0.0103 0.0363
Refusal rate 0.230 0.112 0 0.625 0.0601 0.1 0.389 0.0952 -0.0893 0.588
Variables (normalised)
Price differential -0.000 0.231 -0.573 0.775 0.225 -0.422 0.662 0.055 -0.176 0.164
Land value diff. -0.000 0.483 -1.450 1.458 0.455 -1.012 1.216 0.169 -0.569 0.639
Const. cost diff -0.000 0.054 -0.160 0.192 0.050 -0.101 0.160 0.021 -0.063 0.102
Desig. share (z-value) -0.000 0.993 -4.824 1.765 0.997 -4.798 1.725 0.072 -0.603 1.040
Pred. refusal (z-value) 0.000 0.993 -4.514 2.352 0.910 -2.850 1.942 0.411 -1.879 1.335
Notes: Descriptive statistics for panel dataset with 66 cities × 11 years = 726 observations overall. Standard variables are: the price of a
house with average characteristics in each HMA (based on predictions from hedonic regression), the residential land value (mean of bulk,
small and flats), the construction cost index (100=UK average in 1996), the share of HMA land that is designated, and the planning ap-
plication refusal rate. The normalised versions of the variables are those used in the empirical analysis after being processed as described
in the data section. The ’diff.’ variables are log differentials (in each year) and hence have a mean of zero. The ‘z-value’ variables are
additionally divided by the standard deviation in each year and hence have a between-group standard deviation of approximately one.
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Table 2: Degree share regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS FE & Trends FE & Trends
Designation share 0.010* −0.002
(0.005) (0.002)
Counterfactual designation 0.001 −0.062
(0.005) (0.043)
F-stat 3.619 0.029 0.965 2.069
R2 0.068 0.000 0.002 0.023
AIC -543.0 -532.7 -1239.3 -1242.4
Numbers of HMAs 74 74 74 74
Observations 148 148 148 148
Notes: The dependent variable is degree share (differential) in 2001 and 2011. Fixed effects and
trends are implemented by demeaning and detrending the variables beforehand. This pre-step
was carried out using two separate samples: (i) annual data over 1997–2007 for the designation
shares and (ii) Census data for 1991, 2001 and 2011 for the degree share. The data were then
merged for two years, 2001 and 2011. The designation shares for 2007 were used for 2011 as
this is the closest possible match. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on HMAs.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 3: Housing quantity regression
Output Area Housing Market Area
Dep. Var.: Log Dwelling count OLS(1)
FE
(2)
OLS
(3)
FE
(4)
IV
(5)
Conservation area land share 0.022*** 0.001 0.003* −0.000 −0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
R2 0.010 0.872 0.085 1.000 1.000
Number of Areas 165665 165663 74 74 74
Observations 1655727 1655725 740 740 740
Notes: Regressions of logged dwelling count on conservation area land share at the city (Housing Mar-
ket Area, HMA) and very local (Output Area, OA) levels. Conservation area land share has been scaled
to give the effect of an average-sized designation for each geography. The fixed effects specification in-
cludes HMA trends, and the IV specification includes a trend variable interacted with the initial value
of the instrument and designation share. The regressions demonstrate that designation does not signifi-
cantly decrease housing quantity. The pooled OLS specifications in columns (1) and (3) demonstrate a
significant positive relationship most likely due to unobservables. However, there is no effect once fixed
effects have been included in columns (2) and (4) and when instrumenting in column (5) for HMAs with
the counterfactual designation share used for the main specifications in this paper. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered on the geographical units.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Cost function
Panel Fixed Effects Instrumental Variable
Cobb-Douglas Translog Cobb-Douglas Translog
Unrestr.
(1)
Restrict.
(2)
Unrestr.
(3)
Restrict.
(4)
Unrestr.
(5)
Restrict.
(6)
Unrestr.
(7)
Restrict.
(8)
Land value differential 0.178*** 0.172*** 0.180*** 0.175*** 0.176*** 0.173*** 0.185*** 0.181***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
Constr. cost differential 0.553*** 0.828*** 0.527*** 0.825*** 0.635*** 0.827*** 0.544*** 0.819***
(0.138) (0.022) (0.123) (0.021) (0.119) (0.014) (0.110) (0.012)
Conservation area land 0.159*** 0.158*** 0.169*** 0.165*** 0.480*** 0.600*** 0.496*** 0.433***
share (z-value) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.037) (0.131) (0.117) (0.123) (0.087)
Predicted refusal rate 0.099*** 0.092*** 0.101*** 0.087*** 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.026***
(z-value) (0.021) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Land value differential 0.021 0.018 0.074*** 0.058***
squared (0.026) (0.020) (0.013) (0.011)
Constr. cost differential −1.409 0.018 -0.261 0.058***
squared (1.249) (0.020) (1.257) (0.011)
Land value differential −0.101 -0.035 -0.717*** −0.117***
× Constr. cost diff. (0.262) (0.041) (0.234) (0.022)
R2 0.975 0.975 0.976 0.975 0.950 0.940 0.951 0.954
AIC -2488.9 -2480.9 -2491.1 -2482.2 -2348.7 -2381.4 -2363.0 -2363.0
Number of HMAs 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
Observations 726 726 726 726 726 726 726 726
p-value for CRS 0.048 0.095 0.105 0.001
p-value for CD 0.595 0.098 0.000 0.000
p-value for all restrictions 0.169 0.000
Elasticity of substitution 1.000 1.000 0.755 1.000 1.000 0.213
F-stat of instruments 33.73 33.73 38.08 38.08
Notes: Fixed effects and IV regressions of equation (7). The dependent variable is the house price differential. All columns include HMA fixed
effects. Fixed effects models include individual HMA trends. IV models include a trend variable interacted with the initial value (in 1997) for the
instrument, and with other city characteristics. The instrument is the counterfactual designation share given by equation (9) and first stages for the
restricted translog model are reported in Appendix B in the web appendix. The elasticity of substitution is computed as σY = 1− 2β3/[β1(1− β1)].
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on HMAs.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Alternative specifications for cost function
Panel Fixed Effects Instrumental Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline
model
Undev.
interact
Factor
non-neut.
Cumulat.
desigat.
Baseline
model
Undev.
interact
Factor
non-neut.
Cumulat.
designat.
Conservation area land share (z-value) 0.165*** 0.164*** 0.433*** 0.947***
(0.037) (0.038) (0.087) (0.235)
CA land share × Above-average 0.189*** 0.327***
undev. share (0.034) (0.119)
CA land share × Below-average 0.052 -3.437***
undev. share (0.117) (0.995)
CA land share × (land value −0.008 0.238***
diff. − construction cost diff.) (0.027) (0.088)
Cumulative conservation area 0.767 1.368***
designation (z-value) (0.510) (0.270)
R2 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.954 0.886 0.893 0.946
AIC -2482.2 -2745.5 -2743.3 -2481.9 -2363.0 -2385.7 -2381.4 -2370.3
Numbers of HMAs 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
Observations 726 726 726 726 726 726 726 726
p-value for CRS 0.095 0.093 0.075 0.108 0.001 0.521 0.401 0.013
Elasticity of substitution 0.755 0.740 0.724 0.740 0.213 -0.022 2.535 0.350
F-stat of instruments 38.08 6.45 3.60 48.98
Notes: Alternative regressions of the restricted translog cost function. Columns (1)–(4) are variants of fixed effects model from Tab. 4, col. (4) and
columns (5)–(8) of the IV model from Tab. 4, col. (8). The dependent variable is the house price differential. Only conservation area variables dif-
fer from baseline specification and to save space the other variables are not presented in this table. The instrument is the counterfactual designation
share given by equation (9) and first stages are reported in Appendix B in the web appendix. The reported F-stat of instruments is the Cragg-Donald
statistic in columns (6) and (7) where there is more than one instrument. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on HMAs.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Quality of life regressions
Panel Fixed Effects Instrumental Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline
model
Undev.
interact
Factor
non-neut.
Cumulat.
desigat.
Baseline
model
Undev.
interact
Factor
non-neut.
Cumulat.
designat.
Conservation area land share 0.077*** 0.074*** 0.071** 0.163***
(z-value) (0.019) (0.020) (0.033) (0.045)
CA land share × Above-average 0.088*** 0.046*
undev. share (0.025) (0.028)
CA land share × Below-average 0.024 -0.845***
undev. share (0.032) (0.234)
CA land share × (land value −0.008 0.029***
diff. − construction cost diff.) (0.009) (0.008)
Cumulative conservation area 0.294*** 0.388***
designation (z-value) (0.074) (0.087)
Predicted refusal rate (z-value) 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.002 0.005* 0.006** −0.000
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Residuals 0.266*** 0.266*** 0.266*** 0.266*** 0.245*** 0.256*** 0.190*** 0.291***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.046) (0.031) (0.026)
1st step specification Tab. 4,Col. (4)
Tab. 5,
Col. (2)
Tab. 5,
Col. (3)
Tab. 5,
Col. (4)
Tab. 4,
Col. (8)
Tab. 5,
Col. (6)
Tab. 5,
Col. (7)
Tab. 5,
Col. (8)
R2 0.955 0.955 0.955 0.954 0.934 0.934 0.928 0.937
AIC -4121.2 -4120.1 -4259.9 -4247.5 -3836.5 -3829.3 -3769.5 -3864.8
Observations 726 726 726 726 726 726 726 726
F-stat of instruments 63.62 18.51 32.21 70.04
Notes: Fixed effects and IV regressions of equation (8). Dependent variable is a quality of life index computed according to equation (5). All columns
include HMA fixed effects. Fixed effects models include individual HMA trends. IV models include a trend variable interacted with the initial value
(in 1997) for the instrument, and with other city characteristics. The instrument in columns (5)–(8) is the counterfactual designation share given by
equation (9) and first stages are reported in Appendix B in the web appendix. The reported F-stat of instruments is the Cragg-Donald statistic in
columns (6) and (7) where there is more than one instrument. The welfare impact can be computed as the coefficients here minus the share of expen-
diture on housing times the coefficients from the first step specification. For example, for column (5) a one-point increase in designation results in a
0.071-(0.31*0.433)=-0.063 decrease in welfare expressed as a share of expenditure. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on HMAs.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Appendix A Data
A.1 Weights
As described in the data section, the different data are aggregated to Housing Market Areas
(HMAs) using weights. The weighting variable used in each case is described in Table A1.
Weights were used even where it would have been possible to compute the data directly
at the HMA level, such as for designation share, in order to maintain consistency across
variables. In tables B8 and B9 I estimate the model with unweighted versions of all these
variables and the results are robust.
A.2 Hedonic regression
Table A2 below presents the results of the hedonic regression of equation (4) from the main
paper. The 1,184 HMA-year effects themselves are omitted to save space. The coefficients on
the property characteristics are mostly significant and are in line with expectations. Most
interesting are the results for building age and build year. Houses built during historical
periods are associated with a higher price, in particular those built pre-1900, which are 36%
more expensive than houses built post-2000. Houses built between 1910 and 1939 are also
associated with large premiums of between 21% and 24%. The lowest premium is observed
for houses built in the 1970s. Since the data cover a period of 15 years it is possible to
identify both age and build year separately. Given that the general trend is for earlier build
dates to have higher prices, one might expect house age to be positively correlated with
price as well. However, the opposite is true. After controlling for build date, which captures
the effect of architectural styles and build materials associated with a particular period, the
effect of ageing is to lower the housing value. This ageing penalty is incurred fairly linearly
up until about 100 years of age when it begins to reverse. Houses with 90–99 and over 100
years of age are less valuable than new houses (controlling for build date) but more valuable
than houses of 80–89, 70–79 and even 60–69 years of age. This could be attributed to the
effect of an accumulation of character over the years which begins to set in at around 90
years of age.
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A.3 Land value data and validation
A.3.1 Land valuations regression
In order to produce an overall land value index from the valuations data, I regress logged
value on a dummy variable for the bulk site category plus local authority (LA) fixed effects
in each year. Small sites were therefore the baseline category. I ignored values for flat sites
since these were not available for all LAs and were not likely to be representative values.
The results of this regression are presented in Table A3. These results confirm that bulk
land is considerably cheaper (4.9%–11.2%) than small plots in each year, consistent with the
‘plattage effect’ [as documented by e.g. Colwell and Sirmans, 1993]. The land value index is
then constructed as the average of the two predicted values (small and bulk sites) for that
LA. This adjusts for price differences between site categories.
A.3.2 Valuations data
The Valuation Office Agency describes the need to base its land value index on expert
valuations rather than on transactions:
The problem with the transactions data was that in London and, to some
extent the South East, the number of building plots with planning permission sold
on the open market has, in recent years, fallen to such a trickle that it is no longer
possible to calculate a reliable average price based on transactions. Developers
tend now to buy up old houses, factories or disused warehouses – paying the
market price for the buildings – then demolish the existing buildings and put
up a new development. The advantage of the approach based on valuation, is
that the data set is based on a consistent set of valuations over time and is not
skewed by atypical sales that may distort regional averages when sale volumes
are limited (VOA document. File reference: hlpr4-r-cy).
Since land transaction prices will be discounted for (unobservable) demolition costs which
vary systematically across location and time, an index based on a hedonic approach would
be unreliable. Expert assessors, on the other hand, apply detailed knowledge of the market
to provide estimates of the value of land when transacted under normal conditions.
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A.3.3 Validating land valuations with transaction prices
I make use of data on 923 plots of land sold at auction over the period 2000–2012.1 This
represents too few observations to be used to construct a time-varying land value index
suitable for empirical analysis. However, they can serve to validate the index based on
valuation. Figure A1 plots the auction land values against land valuations for individual
LAs.2 There is a strong fit with the land valuations, especially given that the auctions-based
index uses an average of only eight observations per LA. The fitted values align closely with
the 45 degree line and the (highly significant) coefficient for the valuations is almost exactly
equal to one (0.999). The R2 of 0.721 demonstrates a very strong correlation between the
auction prices and the valuations.
The valuations-based index from Figure A1 is equal to the LA fixed effects from a re-
gression of logged price per hectare on site category (as Table A3 above, but pooled across
years). The auctions-based index is equal to the LA fixed effects from a regression of logged
price per hectare on plot characteristics (Table A4). Both regressions also include year ef-
fects. The baseline category in the auctions regression is vacant land with outline residential
planning permission – the same as the type of land reflected by the land valuations data.
The estimate for plot size confirms that the plattage effect holds for the auction prices, too.
A.4 Construction price index
The construction price index data was taken from the Regional Supplement to the Guide
to House Rebuilding Costs published by the Building Cost Information Service (BCIS). The
BCIS produces the index using a hedonic approach and data on tender prices for accepted
construction projects. The index and sample sizes are available at the local authority (LA)
level but not for every LA in every year. Figure A2 plots the share of LAs that are missing
in each year and shows that the problem is worse at the beginning of the data period. In
order to fill these missing values, data were taken from a higher-level geography (48 counties)
which was fully available over the whole period.
For counties with missing LAs, the county value was compared with the available LAs
in that country to interpolate the values of the missing LAs. This was made possible by
the fact that the index reports the sample size for each LA and for the county as a whole.
1I begin with a dataset of 12,845 plots but drop those which lack information on the size of the plot and
the sale price, plus those that do not have a residential planning permission status of ‘applied for’, ‘outlined’,
or ‘fully granted’ and are thus too dissimilar to the land valuations.
2In order to improve precision, I only include the 61 LAs that have at least five auction transactions.
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This enabled a calculation of the number of observations that were in missing LAs and their
average value. The average value for the ‘rest of county’ for county c was computed as:
vROC,c =
vcsc −∑d vd,csd,c
sc −∑d sd,c (A1)
where vc is the county value, sc is the county sample size, vd,c is the value for available LA d
in county c, and sd,c is the sample size for those LAs. I then worked backward from the most
complete year (2008) applying ‘rest of county’ growth rates to actual figures where necessary
to interpolate for LAs missing in earlier years.
Whilst the number of missing LAs is quite large, especially at the beginning, the method
used to fill them makes use of actual information on their values imputed from higher tier
geographies. This will be more accurate where the missing LAs within a county have similar
factors, since they are all treated as an aggregate ‘rest of county’. Where they differ signifi-
cantly, this will only matter when they end up being aggregated to different HMAs later on
in the process. Finally, the filled LAs are likely to be smaller ones with less dwellings and
so will contribute less when eventually aggregated with other LAs to the HMAs level.
A.5 Quality of life rankings
Table A5 presents the HMAs when ranked by the quality of life index. It also lists values for
the differentials and z-scores used in the cost function. The quality of life ranking in many
cases corresponds to that presented in Gibbons et al. [2011] with areas such as Penzance
(West Cornwall), Brighton and London coming near the top and areas such as Coventry,
Grimsby and Scunthorpe coming near the bottom. This is, of course, no confirmation of its
validity but is nevertheless reassuring.
A.6 Counterfactual designation shares
The instrument for designation is the interaction of the national level (excluding own HMA-
j) designation share in each build date band Db−1,t, with HMA-j’s initial shares of housing
stock in each build band Hjb0. Of the 1,095,945 observations in the transaction dataset I
keep only units where the build date was pre-1997 (the study period). The first column of
Table A6 illustrates the distribution of the remaining 969,417 observations across build date
bands. I assume that a unit transacted in any year exists at the same location from their
build year y until the end of the study period in 2007. I define the unit as having designation
4
status in year t (= 1997, 1998, ...2007) if it is inside a conservation area with a designation
date before or equal to t. The remaining columns of Table A6 illustrate the national-level
designation shares for units within each build date band. This national level designation
shares in this table are similar to the Db−1,t variable, except the influence of own HMA-js
has not been removed. The share is computed as Dbt = ND=1,bt/Nb where ND=1,bt is the
number of units in age band b that are inside a designated conservation area in time period
t and Nb is the total number of units in age band b.
To compute age-band shares for the initial HMA-stock I used only Nationwide observa-
tions for 1995–1996. The calculation is Hjb0 = Njb0/Nj0 where Njb0 is the number of units
in HMA-j and age band j sold in t = 0 (1995-1996), and Nj0 is the number sold across all
bands.
The Nationwide data is, of course, not a representative sample of all housing in each
HMA. Some units may not have been transacted in the period and will not appear in the
dataset at all. Others will appear multiple times. However, a transactions dataset may
be the best source of detailed property characteristics (unit build date) with a precise geo-
graphical breakdown (inside/outside conservation areas). The fixed effects and year effects
(differentials) used in the empirical specification should remove most of the bias introduced
by regional and annual differences in the types of property sold.
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Figure A1: Auctions data against land valuations
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Notes: The auctions index is equal to the LA fixed effects from a regression of logged price per hectare on
plot characteristics (Table A4). The valuations-based index is equal to the LA fixed effects from logged
price per hectare on site category (as Table A3 but pooled across years). In order to improve precision, I
plot here only the 61 LAs that have at least five auction transactions.
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Figure A2: Share of missing construction price factors at LA level, 1997–2007
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Table A1: Weights used to aggregated to HMA level
Variable Source data unit Weight variable
Land values LA LA Dwellings 2003
Refusals LA LA Dwellings 2003
Construction costs LA LA Dwellings 2003
Protected land shares LA LA Dwellings 2003
House prices Postcode LA Dwellings 2003÷LA count
Council tax LA LA Dwellings 2003
Amenities Postcode LA Dwellings 2003÷LA count
Wages LA LA Employment 2003
Population density LA no weight
Designation LA LA Dwellings 2003
Saiz index HMA no weight
Notes: The Saiz index is left unweighted as it reflects exogenous factors. The popula-
tion variable does not require weighting. LA refers to local authority. HMA refers to
Housing Market Areas. LA count refers to the transaction count in the LA in each year
from Nationwide data.
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Table A2: Hedonic regression
(1)
log price
Number of bathrooms 0.009**
(0.004)
Number of bedrooms 0.093***
(0.007)
Number of bedrooms × Number of bedrooms −0.009***
(0.001)
Detached house −0.032
(0.026)
Semi-detached house −0.157***
(0.023)
Terraced house/Country cottage −0.251***
(0.021)
Bungalow 0.052**
(0.023)
Floorsize (m2) 0.008***
(0.000)
Floorsize (m2) × Floorsize (m2) −0.000***
(0.000)
New property 0.070***
(0.004)
Single garage 0.106***
(0.010)
Double garage 0.163***
(0.016)
Parking space 0.050***
(0.010)
Central heating 0.133***
(0.003)
Building age: 10–19 years −0.061***
(0.007)
Building age: 20–29 years −0.098***
(0.015)
Building age: 30–39 years −0.125***
(0.025)
Building age: 40–49 years −0.152***
(0.039)
Building age: 50–59 years −0.180***
(0.051)
Building age: 60–69 years −0.201***
Continued on next page
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Table A2: Hedonic regression – continued from previous page
(1)
log price
(0.059)
Building age: 70–79 years −0.212***
(0.067)
Building age: 80–89 years −0.226***
(0.074)
Building age: 90–99 years −0.190***
(0.072)
Building age: Over 100 years −0.147**
(0.069)
Build date: 1900–1909 0.174**
(0.074)
Build date: 1910–1919 0.223***
(0.077)
Build date: 1920–1929 0.237***
(0.074)
Build date: 1930–1939 0.211***
(0.066)
Build date: 1940–1949 0.145**
(0.057)
Build date: 1950–1959 0.108**
(0.048)
Build date: 1960–1969 0.101***
(0.035)
Build date: 1970–1979 0.068***
(0.025)
Build date: 1980–1989 0.104***
(0.016)
Build date: 1990–1999 0.093***
(0.009)
Build date: pre-1900 0.355***
(0.079)
R2 0.850
AIC 232410.5
Number of HMA-Years 1184
Observations 904075
Notes: Regression of equation (4) from main paper. The dependent variable is log house price. The omitted
category for Build date is post-2000; for Building age it is 0–9 years; for House type it is Flat/Maisonette;
and for Parking type it is No parking. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on HMA-years.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A3: Land valuations regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Bulk site −0.112***−0.096***−0.078***−0.067***−0.059***−0.056***−0.049***−0.051***−0.061***−0.068***−0.070***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Constant 6.587*** 6.711*** 6.809*** 6.955*** 7.105*** 7.277*** 7.505*** 7.675*** 7.818*** 7.894*** 7.982***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
R2 0.985 0.988 0.989 0.991 0.990 0.995 0.994 0.995 0.995 0.994 0.995
Observations 703 706 706 707 707 707 708 708 708 708 708
Notes: The dependent variable is logged land values. Bulk sites are valuations for sites of two hectares or larger. The omitted category is small
sites (<2 ha). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on LAs.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A4: Land value auctions regression
(1)
Dep. var.: log value per ha
Plot size (hectares) −0.046***
(0.010)
Commericial land use 0.379
(0.430)
Agricultural land use −2.750***
(0.235)
Non-vacant 0.099
(0.511)
Res. planning: applied for −0.364
(0.455)
Res. planning: fully granted −0.042
(0.104)
Com. planning: outlined 0.004
(0.378)
Com. planning: fully granted 0.156
(0.268)
Constant 6.613***
(0.352)
R2 0.600
Observations 923
Notes: The dependent variable is logged land value (£000s) per hectare. Year ef-
fects are also included. Only residential land is included in the regression but some
plots have multiple land use types. The variables ‘commercial land use’ and ‘agri-
cultural land use’ refer to suggested land use type, whereas the planning variables
describe the extent to which permission has been given to build. The baseline cat-
egory is vacant land with outline residential planning permission. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered on LAs.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A5: HMA characteristics ranked by quality of life
HMA name Qualityof life
House
price
diff.
Land
value
diff.
Constr.
diff.
Des.
share
(z-val.)
Re-
fusals
(z-val.)
Saiz
index
(z-val.)
Pop.
dens.
(z-val.)
Penzance 0.175 0.120 -0.523 0.021 0.403 0.788 1.742 -1.578
Launceston and Bude 0.121 -0.003 -0.589 -0.018 -0.850 0.215 1.089 -1.323
Dorchester and Weymouth 0.116 0.202 0.222 0.025 0.422 0.464 0.882 -0.731
Torquay 0.109 0.100 0.121 0.007 -0.199 0.449 0.943 -0.026
Eastbourne and Hastings 0.096 0.219 0.146 0.113 -0.976 1.233 0.485 0.150
Barnstaple 0.093 0.002 -0.150 0.013 -1.239 0.840 0.653 -0.768
Truro 0.084 0.058 -0.403 -0.030 -0.009 0.331 1.398 -0.582
Berwick-upon-Tweed 0.083 -0.207 -0.663 -0.010 -0.219 -3.825 0.994 -2.403
Whitby and Malton 0.078 0.000 -0.235 -0.047 -0.730 -1.033 0.027 -1.760
Exeter 0.077 0.153 0.307 -0.006 -0.137 0.598 0.214 -0.104
IsleOfWight 0.071 0.081 -0.302 0.039 0.340 1.251 1.637 -0.879
Hereford 0.069 0.033 0.129 -0.052 -0.142 0.352 -0.228 -0.425
Brighton 0.068 0.439 0.588 0.100 0.627 1.005 0.525 0.842
Salisbury 0.067 0.301 0.455 0.033 0.317 0.770 -0.917 -1.031
Portsmouth 0.063 0.283 0.633 0.068 0.266 0.558 0.404 0.844
Bournemouth 0.058 0.285 0.526 0.031 0.733 1.473 0.224 0.409
London 0.046 0.673 1.450 0.161 1.567 1.018 -0.484 3.277
StAustell 0.042 -0.026 -0.484 -0.023 -0.743 0.757 1.184 -1.161
Worcester 0.041 0.100 0.332 0.004 0.289 0.313 -0.876 0.088
Oxford 0.040 0.448 0.975 0.030 1.059 0.601 -1.626 0.546
Northallerton 0.038 0.031 0.165 -0.024 0.717 -0.190 -0.455 -0.904
Kendal 0.036 0.034 0.007 -0.045 -2.872 -1.049 1.061 -1.126
BuryStEdmunds 0.034 0.069 0.238 0.015 0.677 0.243 -1.744 -0.740
Penrith 0.034 -0.136 -0.636 0.051 -1.027 -0.117 0.743 -1.777
Colchester 0.033 0.186 0.403 0.059 0.424 0.239 0.434 0.610
Taunton 0.032 0.054 0.057 -0.017 -0.727 -0.004 1.129 -0.301
Bath 0.031 0.197 0.436 0.005 0.835 0.932 -0.903 0.300
Canterbury and Ramsgate 0.027 0.102 0.432 0.113 1.744 0.302 1.411 0.076
Southampton 0.023 0.325 0.750 0.038 0.427 1.317 -0.342 0.704
Plymouth 0.022 -0.012 -0.154 -0.027 0.502 0.497 0.265 0.078
Yeovil 0.015 0.042 0.251 -0.001 0.251 -0.493 -0.736 -0.747
Norwich 0.013 -0.019 -0.255 -0.020 1.474 -0.403 -1.539 0.491
Dover and Ashford 0.008 0.130 0.211 0.069 0.032 0.779 0.843 -0.487
Telford 0.000 -0.094 -0.133 -0.045 0.295 -0.107 -0.870 -0.452
Ipswich -0.006 0.043 -0.016 -0.002 -0.642 -0.434 -0.361 0.168
Shrewsbury -0.006 -0.031 -0.108 -0.033 -0.296 0.684 -0.770 -0.551
Skegness -0.006 -0.275 -0.593 -0.047 -1.290 0.080 0.323 -0.870
Gloucester and Cheltenham -0.012 0.124 0.399 0.014 0.654 0.616 -0.022 0.333
GtYarmouth and Lowestoft -0.016 -0.172 -0.546 -0.029 1.198 0.060 1.206 -0.466
York -0.017 0.077 0.217 -0.014 0.264 0.269 -1.474 -0.242
KingsLynn -0.018 -0.140 -0.645 -0.001 -4.437 -0.697 0.500 -0.848
Scarborough -0.019 -0.143 -0.268 -0.014 -1.744 -2.070 1.227 -1.089
Luton and MiltonKeynes -0.024 0.230 0.468 0.067 0.333 0.705 -1.544 0.961
Continued on next page
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Table A5: HMA characteristics – continued from previous page
HMA name Qualityof life
House
price
diff.
Land
value
diff.
Constr.
diff.
Des.
share
(z-val.)
Re-
fusals
(z-val.)
Saiz
index
(z-val.)
Pop.
dens.
(z-val.)
Cambridge -0.024 0.267 0.492 0.035 0.167 0.293 -1.132 0.436
Carlisle -0.024 -0.286 -0.558 -0.005 -0.577 -2.641 0.112 -1.116
Swindon -0.026 0.202 0.417 0.019 0.750 0.238 -0.791 0.127
Birmingham -0.028 0.014 0.296 -0.027 0.634 0.096 -1.441 2.019
Stoke-on-Trent -0.028 -0.184 -0.400 -0.039 0.053 0.239 -1.145 0.770
Boston -0.029 -0.277 -0.680 -0.043 -1.174 -0.191 0.718 -0.840
Northampton -0.035 -0.037 0.101 0.006 0.142 -0.540 -1.467 0.589
Bristol -0.038 0.165 0.611 0.012 1.380 0.765 0.794 0.837
Peterborough -0.039 -0.127 -0.172 -0.015 -0.086 -0.533 -0.957 0.171
Leicester -0.039 -0.055 0.164 -0.050 -0.068 -0.616 -1.852 0.911
Preston and Blackpool -0.040 -0.127 0.086 0.008 -0.639 -0.035 0.930 0.613
Newcastle -0.041 -0.208 -0.182 -0.037 0.507 -1.517 -0.483 1.622
Blackburn and Burnley -0.043 -0.296 -0.417 0.016 -0.051 -0.419 0.245 0.262
Lincoln -0.043 -0.273 -0.538 -0.052 -0.630 -0.527 -1.525 -0.229
Manchester -0.045 -0.052 0.130 0.001 0.826 0.084 0.497 1.865
Chester and Birkenhead -0.047 -0.048 -0.452 0.011 0.619 -0.028 0.477 0.370
Reading -0.050 0.529 0.906 0.097 0.588 1.559 -1.197 1.277
Leeds -0.051 -0.083 0.216 -0.049 0.680 0.010 -0.877 1.556
Coventry -0.053 0.044 0.329 -0.013 0.072 -0.966 -1.545 0.588
Bradford -0.056 -0.151 -0.201 -0.092 -0.458 0.345 0.290 0.702
Nottingham -0.059 -0.164 -0.001 -0.059 1.006 -0.167 -1.395 1.034
Hull -0.068 -0.283 -0.183 -0.014 0.583 -0.037 0.255 0.487
Liverpool -0.068 -0.149 -0.098 -0.001 0.272 -0.582 0.298 1.592
Sheffield -0.069 -0.231 -0.190 -0.030 -0.059 -0.338 -1.072 1.336
Derby -0.070 -0.128 -0.073 -0.075 1.124 -0.670 -0.497 0.542
Middlesbrough -0.089 -0.273 -0.404 -0.046 0.346 -1.496 1.111 0.447
Lancaster -0.094 -0.148 0.134 -0.055 -0.181 -0.472 1.037 -0.861
Grimsby -0.098 -0.360 -0.528 -0.100 0.228 0.256 0.966 -0.726
Barrow-in-Furness -0.109 -0.361 -0.624 0.037 -0.185 -0.889 1.742 -1.463
Workington and Whitehaven -0.146 -0.391 -0.904 0.037 -2.712 -0.571 1.248 -0.693
Scunthorpe -0.172 -0.412 -0.492 -0.048 -0.720 0.032 0.006 -0.731
Notes: Figures for time-variant data represent the mean across all time periods for each HMA. The Saiz index and
Population density are time-invariant.
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Table A6: Distribution of transactions across build date bands
Share designated by year
Band Total 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Growth 97-07
Built 0-1870 41,251 0.396 0.397 0.398 0.399 0.400 0.401 0.402 0.402 0.403 0.404 0.405 0.025
Built 1870s 7,630 0.353 0.355 0.357 0.359 0.360 0.361 0.363 0.364 0.366 0.366 0.368 0.041
Built 1880s 20,317 0.302 0.304 0.305 0.306 0.307 0.310 0.312 0.314 0.315 0.316 0.317 0.052
Built 1890s 30,149 0.200 0.201 0.202 0.203 0.205 0.208 0.212 0.212 0.213 0.214 0.215 0.074
Built 1900s 134,455 0.114 0.115 0.117 0.117 0.119 0.121 0.122 0.123 0.124 0.125 0.126 0.103
Built 1910s 23,111 0.092 0.093 0.094 0.094 0.095 0.096 0.097 0.098 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.083
Built 1920s 28,363 0.069 0.070 0.071 0.071 0.072 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.074 0.074 0.075 0.080
Built 1930s 144,424 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.140
Built 1940s 13,073 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.079
Built 1950s 80,764 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.094
Built 1960s 103,778 0.029 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.067
Built 1970s 123,645 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.048
Built 1980s 125,409 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.046
Built 1990-1996 93,048 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.030
Total 969,417 0.073 0.074 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.076 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.078 0.078 0.065
Notes: Share of units inside designated conservation areas based on Nationwide transaction data. Each observation sold in any year 1995–
2010 is assumed to exist throughout the sample period. Time variation in designation share is, therefore, driven only by new designations.
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Appendix B Results
B.1 Estimations using alternative spatial units
As discussed, for the approach taken in this paper it is important to use areas that are highly
self-contained (i.e. people who live in a given area also work in that area) in order to relate
to the theoretical model and to capture supply (and demand) effects that play out at the
level of the housing market. However, it is common to check that results are robust to using
observational units of different scales to address the modifiable areal unit problem, or MAUP
[Fotheringham and Wong, 1991]. It is not possible to use an alternative city definition such
as travel-to-work-areas (TTWAs) since these do not aggregate from local authorities (LAs).
However, I am able to use the LA level itself to estimate both the cost function and the
quality of life step at this spatial scale. This represents a potentially useful robustness check
under the caveat that LAs are not self-contained areas. People often live in one LA and work
in another LA in the same city, making them incompatible with the theoretical locations,
and unlikely to capture the full effects of designation.
I present the results in Table B1 where column (1) is the baseline HMA specification and
column (2) reports the LA specification. The results imply a smaller housing productivity
effect but a similar quality of life effect when using the LA scale. To some extent these results
are to be expected since cost-driven increase in prices will impact on the housing market
level, whereas quality of life impacts are more likely to be spatially confined. If designation
impacts on housing productivity in one LA in a city, it will impact on prices throughout the
city since housing units that offer access to the same labour market are substitutable and
in competition with one another. This explains why examining the LA specification shows
a lower productivity effect. On the demand side, Ahlfeldt et al. [2017] demonstrate that the
amenity effects of conservation areas tend to be spatially localised, which helps to explain
why the quality of life estimates are almost unchanged moving to the smaller LA units.
Overall, at the LA level, conservation areas are approximately welfare-neutral. However, as
discussed this is likely because it misses the broader supply-side impact on housing costs.
The robustness check is useful since it helps to reveal the different spatial scales of the effects
and to confirm that approach works using alternative spatial units.
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B.2 Investigating potential employment effects
The analysis assumes that the major effects of conservation area designation are captured
through the quality of life and housing productivity effects. However, if designation fosters
tourism, it could impact on welfare by creating jobs in a city. I investigate this possibility
in Table B2 by regressing the logged job count on the designation share at the HMA level.
Whilst the fixed effects specification reveals a small negative effect, this unexpected result
is likely due to unobservables not captured by the trends. In the instrumented specification,
there is no effect of designation on jobs. This finding is supportive of the approach taken in
this paper and reflects existing evidence that suggests improvements to the amenity value
of housing mainly impacts on the property market, and not on productivity or employment
[What Works Centre for Local Economic Growth, 2015].
B.3 Estimating the cost function with instrumented land values
Table B3 shows that instrumentation of land values increases the land cost share from 19%
to 29% in both the Cobb-Douglas and translog specifications. The larger instrumented land
cost share is consistent with an “old land buyer’s rule of thumb” that land represents about
one third of the total value of housing [Hudson, 2015]. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test easily
rejects the null hypothesis that land values are exogenous, suggesting that instrumentation
is necessary to obtain a consistent estimate of the land cost share. The increase in the land
cost share suggests that unobserved housing productivity is negatived correlated with land
values. Since instrumentation addresses this bias, the 29% value is the preferred estimate
for the land cost share presented in this paper.
The F-stat for excluded instruments is 8.02 in the Cobb-Douglas model (with one endoge-
nous regressor and one instrument) and 2.6 in the translog model (with three endogenous
regressor and three instruments). According to Stock and Yogo [2005], the 20% maximal
size critical value for one endogenous regressor and one instrument is 6.66. Therefore, for
the Cobb-Douglas the null hypothesis of a weak instrument is rejected for a maximal IV size
somewhere between 15% and 20%. The same critical value for three endogenous regressors
is not reported, therefore, it is not possible to make a similar comparison for the translog
F-stat. Nevertheless, the critical values are declining with both number of endogenous re-
gressors and number of instruments and the value for two regressors and two instruments is
as low as 3.95. Given this, it is possible that the translog model is of similar strength to the
Cobb-Douglas specification.
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B.4 Robustness checks
Table B8 and Table B9 report robustness specifications for the fixed effects and IV models,
respectively. The first row gives the cost function results for designation variables and the
last two rows give the quality of life results. The six regression statistics, including the
elasticity of substitution, refer to the cost function step. The baseline model is repeated
in column (1) in each case for comparison. Column (2) in both tables gives the results
without weighting the variables in aggregation to HMA from LA. The results do not differ
greatly from the baseline specification, suggesting they are not sensitive to the inclusion of
weights. In column (3) in both tables, I estimate the model using only new properties from
the house price dataset. Here, the focus is on the elasticity of substitution parameter which
increases to 0.402 in the instrumented version. The housing productivity effect is slightly
lower in magnitude and the quality of life effect is larger, but this is perhaps mainly due to
reduced sample size and decreased precision. In column (4) in both tables I estimate the
model using the full sample of HMAs, without excluding the eight HMAs with fewer than
100 transactions per year. Here, the results in the cost function step are broadly consistent
with the main specifications, although the elasticity of substitution is smaller. The quality
of life effects are insignificant in the instrumented model, most likely because of the inclusion
of imprecise unit house price estimates.
In columns (5)–(8) I test the robustness of the welfare results to different specifications of
the quality of life measure. Column (5) allows for regional variation in the share of wages in
total income and regional-year variation in the marginal tax rate. There is almost no change
in the effect on quality of life, suggesting the results are not sensitive to using average values
for these shares. In columns (6), (7) and (8) I test for robustness to the assumed share of
housing in total expenditure. In the main specifications I use a share of 0.31 which results
in an overall welfare effect of -0.06 of expenditure. However, as recreated in Table B7, the
Expenditure and Food Survey, 2006 reports that the share of expenditure on housing varies
significantly by income decile. Overall, the shares tend to be larger for poorer households
than for richer households. Notably, though, the smallest share is for the poorest households,
most likely an effect of housing benefits. The highest share across income deciles is 0.415
and the smallest is 0.263.
In columns (6) and (7) I use a quality of life index computed according to equation (5)
from the main paper using these highest and lowest shares, respectively. Notably, the highest
value is almost exactly equivalent to using a quality of life index that follows Albouy and
Ehrlich [2012] in taking account of local variation in non-housing prices by adding one sixth
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of housing costs to the index. Therefore the result for this specification may be interpreted
as either a test for local non-housing price variation or for a high expenditure share on
housing. Column (6) reports a larger quality of life impact compared with the baseline
specification and column (7) a smaller impact. However, while changes to the share of
expenditure on housing imply different quality of life effects, they also imply different costs
due to housing productivity. In fact, the overall welfare effect for the higher expenditure
share is 0.101 − 0.433 × 0.415 = −0.07 which is a larger welfare reduction than for the
baseline model, despite the greater quality of life benefit. For the smaller cost share it is
0.057− 0.433× 0.263 = −0.05.
In column (8), I use a definition of the quality of life measure where the share of expen-
diture varies for each city based on its average income. Specifically, I compute for each city
the income decile that it falls in based on its average income, and use the equivalent housing
expenditure share from Table B7 in calculating the quality of life index for that city. Based
on their average incomes, the cities fall anywhere from the 4th to the 8th decile resulting in
a variation in the housing expenditure share between 0.272 and 0.364. The resulting quality
of life estimate of 0.082 is slightly larger, although broadly similar to the baseline. However,
the average expenditure share when shares vary according to city income is slightly larger at
0.325. Therefore the final welfare effect is 0.082− 0.433× 0.325 = −0.06, i.e. the same as in
the baseline specification. Overall then, the columns (6)-(8) show that welfare effects do not
deviate very far from the baseline specification despite using a very wide range of housing
expenditure shares.
Finally, the instrumented table has an extra column (9) where I use house prices without
interacting age bands with trends in the hedonic regression. The main results are robust
to this change, suggesting that this factor does not threaten the exclusionary restriction.
Overall, these alternative models appear to support the broad conclusions of the main spec-
ifications.
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Table B1: Local authority specification
(1) (2)
HMA
(baseline) LA
Conservation area 0.433*** 0.247***
land share (z-value) (0.087) (0.047)
Land value differential 0.181*** 0.244***
(0.012) (0.011)
Constr. cost differential 0.819*** 0.756***
(0.012) (0.011)
Land value differential 0.058*** 0.032***
squared (0.011) (0.010)
Constr. cost differential 0.058*** 0.032***
squared (0.011) (0.010)
Land value differential −0.117*** −0.063***
× Constr. cost diff. (0.022) (0.020)
Predicted refusal rate 0.026*** 0.031***
(z-value) (0.007) (0.004)
R2 0.954 0.783
AIC -2363.0 -5712.6
Number of areas 66 282
Observations 726 2970
p-value for CRS 0.001 0.003
Elasticity of substitution 0.213 0.658
Desig. effect on QoL 0.071** 0.078***
Notes: The first column is the baseline model at the
HMA level and the second column is exactly the same
but at the LA level. Other variables are same as in
baseline specifications. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered on geographical unit.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B2: Employment effects
Dep. Var.: Log Employment count FE(4)
IV
(5)
Conservation area land share −0.000** 0.002
(0.000) (0.003)
R2 0.999 0.998
HMAs 74 74
Observations 1036 1036
Notes: Regressions of logged jobs count on conservation area land
share at HMA level, 1997–2010. Conservation area land share has
been scaled to give the effect of an average-sized designation. The
fixed effects specification includes HMA trends, and the IV specifi-
cation includes a trend variable interacted with the initial value of
the instrument and designation share. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses are clustered on HMAs.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B3: Cost function with instrumented land values
Cobb-Douglas
(1)
Translog
(2)
Cobb-Douglas
(3)
Translog
(4)
Land value differential 0.184*** 0.189*** 0.274*** 0.287***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.047) (0.046)
Constr. cost differential 0.816*** 0.811*** 0.726*** 0.713***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.047) (0.046)
Land value differential 0.028*** 0.090**
squared (0.010) (0.039)
Constr. cost differential 0.028*** 0.090**
squared (0.010) (0.039)
Land value differential −0.055*** −0.180**
× Constr. cost diff. (0.020) (0.078)
R2 0.973 0.973 0.970 0.969
Observations 726 726 726 726
p-value for CRS 0.005 0.029
p-value for CD 0.021
p-value for all restrictions 0.038
Elasticity of substitution 0.640 1.000 0.117
F-stat of instruments 8.02 2.61
Durbin-Wu-Hausman (p-value) 0.000 0.000
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) are panel fixed effects and columns (3) and (4) additionally instruments
land values with Bartik shift share. HMA fixed effects and trends in all columns.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table B4: First stages for land value instrumentation
(1) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Bartik 7.082*** 7.454*** −0.022 −0.121
(2.501) (2.569) (2.936) (0.177)
Constr. cost differential 2.757*** 2.784*** −0.150 −0.157***
(0.321) (0.327) (0.374) (0.022)
Bartik squared −2.965 81.179*** 0.759
(15.357) (17.552) (1.056)
Bartik × Constr. 5.154 21.881*** 3.637***
cost (5.007) (5.722) (0.344)
Constr. cost differential −5.019 14.990*** 3.355***
squared (3.088) (3.529) (0.212)
R2 0.929 0.930 0.811 0.927
Observations 726 726 726 726
F-stat of instruments 8.02 3.04 12.98 38.80
Notes: Column (1) relates to (3) and columns (2a), (2b) and (2c)to (4) in Table B3.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 21
Table B5: First stage IV results for cost function regressions
Second stage model:
(1)
Baseline
Model
(2)
Undev.
interact.
(3)
Factor
non-neut
(4)
Cumulat.
designat.
Instrumented var.: Designat. Des. ×>avg. undev.
Des. ×
<avg. undev. Designat.
Des. × (land val.
− cons. cost)
Cumulat.
designat.
Excluded Instruments
Counterfactual designation (z-value) 2.241*** 2.238*** −3.054***
(0.363) (0.363) (0.800)
Counterfactual designation (z-value) 3.576*** 0.105
× Above-average undev. share (0.420) (0.128)
Counterfactual designation (z-value) 0.534 −0.550***
× Below-average undev. share (0.517) (0.158)
Counterfactual des. share × 0.013 −0.137***
(land value diff. − constr. cost diff.) (0.017) (0.036)
Cumulative counterfactual 1.709***
designation (z-value) (0.244)
Other variables
Land value differential −0.010 −0.011 0.000 −0.010 0.001 −0.006
(0.017) (0.015) (0.005) (0.017) (0.036) (0.006)
Constr. cost differential −0.147 −0.170 0.056 −0.152 −0.068 −0.039
(0.139) (0.129) (0.039) (0.139) (0.306) (0.054)
Land value differential squared −0.035** −0.029* 0.005 −0.027 0.849*** −0.003
(0.016) (0.015) (0.005) (0.019) (0.042) (0.006)
Constr. cost differential squared −4.343*** −4.499*** −0.254 −4.323*** 14.478*** −1.234**
(1.566) (1.455) (0.444) (1.566) (3.446) (0.610)
Land value differential × 1.171*** 0.994*** 0.069 1.108*** −5.669*** 0.228**
Constr. cost diff. (0.258) (0.240) (0.073) (0.270) (0.595) (0.102)
Predicted refusal rate (z-value) −0.036*** −0.035*** 0.005** −0.036*** 0.024 −0.001
(0.009) (0.008) (0.002) (0.009) (0.019) (0.003)
R2 0.996 0.996 0.998 0.996 0.954 0.999
Observations 726 726 726 726 726 726
F-stat of instruments 38.08 36.38 6.68 19.33 14.56 48.98
Notes: The first stage estimations for the cost function regressions in Table 5 columns (5)–(8) from the main paper. The instrumented vari-
ables (dependent variables) are variations of the conservation area designation variable. The expected sign of the instrument is positive. All
columns include HMA fixed effects and a trend variable interacted with the initial value (in 1997) for the instrument and with other city
characteristics. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on HMAs.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B6: First stage IV results for quality of life regressions
Second stage model:
(1)
Baseline
Model
(2)
Undev.
interact.
(3)
Factor
non-neut
(4)
Cumulat.
designat.
Instrumented var. (productivity from): Designat. Des. × Above-average undev.
Des. × Below-
average undev. Designat.
Non-neutral
Designat.
Cumulat.
Designation
Excluded Instruments
Counterfactual designation (z-value) 2.493*** 2.177*** −3.535***
(0.313) (0.260) (0.965)
Counterfactual designation (z-value) 3.739*** 0.085
× Above-average undev. share (0.408) (0.072)
Counterfactual designation (z-value) 0.422 −0.536***
× Below-average undev. share (0.513) (0.091)
Counterfactual des. share × 0.026** −0.501***
(land value diff. − constr. cost diff.) (0.010) (0.039)
Cumulative counterfactual designation 1.598***
(z-value) (0.191)
Predicted refusal rate (z-value) −0.041*** −0.040*** 0.005*** −0.042*** −0.005 −0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.006) (0.022) (0.002)
Residuals −0.657*** −0.136*** 0.188*** −0.593*** −0.669*** −0.279***
(0.045) (0.030) (0.005) (0.024) (0.090) (0.015)
R2 0.997 0.996 0.999 0.998 0.928 1.000
Observations 726 726 726 726 726 726
F-stat of excluded instruments 63.62 42.10 18.54 38.84 91.97 70.04
Notes: The first stage estimations for the quality of life regressions in Table 6 columns (5)–(8) from the main paper. The instrumented variables (depen-
dent variables) are variations of the conservation area designation share. The expected sign of the instrument is positive. Included variables not shown
are: land values, construction costs and their squares, and the interaction of land values and construction costs. All columns include HMA fixed effects
and a trend variable interacted with the initial value (in 1997) for the instrument and with other city characteristics. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered on HMAs.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B7: Expenditure shares on
housing by income decile
Decile Weekly income Share
1 Up to £142 0.263
2 £143 to £214 0.415
3 £215 to £292 0.356
4 £293 to £383 0.272
5 £384 to £496 0.274
6 £497 to £623 0.364
7 £624 to £762 0.301
8 £763 to £938 0.301
9 £939 to £1,273 0.295
10 £1,274 and over 0.328
Notes: Reproduced from Expenditure
and Food Survey, 2006.
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Table B8: Robustness checks for fixed effects models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline
model Unweighted
Only new
properties
Full
sample
Local tax
& wage share
High housing
share (0.415)
Low housing
share (0.263)
Income-varying
housing share
Conservation area 0.165*** 0.136** 0.136*** 0.202*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.165***
land share (z-value) (0.037) (0.060) (0.031) (0.049) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
R2 0.975 0.973 0.958 0.969 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.975
AIC -2482.2 -2453.1 -2376.0 -2642.0 -2482.2 -2482.2 -2482.2 -2482.2
Numbers of HMAs 66 66 66 74 66 66 66 66
Observations 726 726 726 814 726 726 726 726
p-value for CRS 0.095 0.093 0.000 0.036 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095
Elasticity of substitution 0.755 0.673 0.742 0.554 0.755 0.755 0.755 0.755
Desig. effect on QoL 0.077*** 0.057*** 0.066*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.106*** 0.064*** 0.120***
Notes: Robustness checks for the fixed effects model. The first row and six regression statistics are variations on the baseline cost function regression (first
step) from Table 4, column (4) from the main paper. The last row reports the quality of life effect from a second step regression that relates to the first step
in the same column. Only the conservation area variable is reported here. Remaining variables are: land values, construction costs and their squares, the
interaction of land values and construction costs, and predicted planning refusal rate. All columns include HMA fixed effects and HMA trends. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered on HMAs.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B9: Robustness checks for instrumented models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Baseline
model Unweighted
Only new
properties
Full
sample
Local tax
& wage share
High housing
share (0.415)
Low housing
share (0.263)
Income-varying
housing share
Original
prices
Conservation area 0.433*** 0.500*** 0.440*** 0.456*** 0.433*** 0.433*** 0.433*** 0.433*** 0.461***
land share (z-value) (0.087) (0.102) (0.089) (0.106) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.089)
R2 0.954 0.950 0.930 0.948 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.952
AIC -2363.0 -2357.6 -2302.8 -2534.7 -2363.0 -2363.0 -2363.0 -2363.0 -2359.2
Numbers of HMAs 66 66 66 74 66 66 66 66 66
Observations 726 726 726 814 726 726 726 726 726
p-value for CRS 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Elasticity of substitution 0.213 0.161 0.402 0.054 0.213 0.213 0.213 0.213 0.217
Desig. effect on QoL 0.071** 0.076** 0.115*** −0.116 0.072** 0.101*** 0.057* 0.082** 0.066**
Notes: Robustness checks for the instrumented model. The first row and six regression statistics are variations on the baseline cost function regression (first
step) from Table 4, column (8) from the main paper. The last row reports the quality of life effect from a second step regression that relates to the first step in
the same column. Only the conservation area variable is reported here. Remaining variables are: land values, construction costs and their squares, the interac-
tion of land values and construction costs, and predicted planning refusal rate. All columns include HMA fixed effects and a trend variable interacted with the
initial value (in 1997) for the instrument and with other city characteristics. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on HMAs.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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